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ABSTRACT
Likitapiwat, Tanakorn. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August, 2010. Two
Essays in Finance. Co-Major Professors: Christine X.Jiang, Ph.D. and Pankaj K. Jain.
Ph.D.

The dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay examines the information
contents of after-hours earnings announcements. The study investigates the after-hours
trading (AHT) activities, price contribution and price discovery following the quarterly
earnings announcements released outside of the normal trading hours. We hypothesize
that trading activity and price discovery on the announcement days are higher than nonannouncement days during the same AHT periods. Similarly, the price discovery on
earnings announcement days is expected to be higher than that of the non-announcements
days during the same AHT periods. For a sample of S&P500 stocks from 2004-2008, we
find that despite lower volume, trading activities after hours are heightened on days with
earnings announcements. A significant portion of price change and price discovery
occurs immediately after the earnings releases during the before market open or after
market close sessions. Prices in AHT show relatively large degree of informational
efficiency, further demonstrating the importance of the price discovery in AHT as these
prices are not likely to be all driven by noise trading.
The second essay is related to the impact of low cost carriers (LCCs)
announcement on the legacy airlines. The successful emergence of low cost carriers
(LCCs) is an important structural and financial development in the airline industry.
Oligopoly structure, entry barriers, and high fixed costs make the industry highly
susceptible to competitive and network expansion impacts of LCC entry. We hypothesize

iv

that LCC entry not only increases competition in the industry but also expands the
number of airline travellers. As a result, the level of competition should have a negative
effect on the returns of legacy airlines while network expansion should have a positive
effect. We conduct event studies and regression analysis to explore the impacts of LCC
entry on legacy airline stock prices. As a surprising result, positive stock returns are
observed, which we interpret as the spillover effects of network expansion. Thus,
economies of scope from increased passengers and connectivity increase the revenues of
legacy airlines to sufficiently offset the LCC competitive threats.
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PREFACE

My dissertation consists of two essays and both involve primarily corporate
events. I think it is a good idea to discuss briefly of the origin of my essays. The first
essay is about the information contents from corporate earnings announcements. Why are
most firms making earnings announcements when market is closed? I was fortunate
enough to meet Dr. Christine Jiang one day and she suggested to me that I explore this
topic. The topic of after-hours earnings announcements has only been pursued by a
limited number of research papers, and it is the aim of this paper to fill the academic gap.
Therefore, I believe this research idea will be interesting and worth exploring since
trading in stock markets is progressing towards a 24-hour market. The details of the
analysis are presented in essay 1. It has been submitted to The Journal of Accounting
Research.
My second essay examines the effect of low cost airlines company
announcements and new market entry on the more established legacy airlines. The
motivation for this paper was generated during a finance seminar with Dr. Pankaj Jain.
He introduced me to Dr. Rose Rubin who was researching low cost airlines. I had heard
of the term low cost airline before but did not know more than the fact that its ticket price
is cheaper than the traditional ones. I found that the interactions between players in the
industry were not only from the competition but also from network expansion. Detailed
analysis of the effects of low cost airlines on the legacy airlines and network expansion
effects and stock returns of the legacy airlines are presented in essay 2. This paper has
been submitted to The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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the skills and techniques necessary to pursue future research opportunities. Without their
guidance, it is not possible for me to learn such research skills on my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate events play significant roles in financial markets. There are various
kinds of announcements including earnings announcements of public companies,
announcements of newly launched products or markets entry, and so on. Information
from an announcement of a corporation could have multiple impacts on several market
participants, such as investors, competitors, and regulators. Investors use information
derived from earnings announcements to help make investment decisions while
competitors can use this information to learn about their position in the market and to
devise competing strategies. Regulators make use of the information to keep pace with
changes in the market to protect investors. We examine the impact of corporate event
announcement from two different perspectives. The first chapter is a study of the
information contents from the after-hours earnings announcements. The second chapter
examines impacts of low cost carriers’ (LCCs) entry announcements on the legacy
airlines.
In chapter 1, we study the information contents following corporate earnings
announcements that are made during market close. Firms have increasingly made their
quarterly earnings announcements outside the regular market hours. Normally, trading
volumes of the aftermarket are very low compared to trading volume during the normal
market hours. Previous research finds that the after-hours periods have lower liquidity,
thin trading volume, higher trading cost and higher price volatility. While all types of
investors, regardless of large or small, and institutional or retail, can now trade in either
regular or after-hours trading sessions. However, stock trading activities still concentrate
in the regular trading hours. We aim to fill the gap in previous literatures on market
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responses in the regular trading hours to earnings announcements made during trading
and non-trading hours. We hypothesize that the trading activities during the after-hours
periods are heightened on the earnings announcement days compared to the nonannouncement days. We also hypothesize that the significant amount of price
contribution and price discovery immediately occur after the announcements.
In chapter 2, we examine the impact of announcements and actual entry of LCCs
on the legacy airlines in term of competition, network expansion and stock valuation.
LCCs have successfully emerged since 1978 and now represent one third of the market.
An entry of LCC is typically perceived as a competitor to the legacy airlines. Many
papers have investigated the impact of LCCs’ entry on the legacy airlines such as airfare
reduction and losses in market share. However, no study has been done on network
expansion benefits of low cost airlines for the legacy airlines. In this chapter, we
investigate the stock price reaction of the legacy airlines when an LCC make an
announcement to enter a new market. We hypothesize two opposing effects of LCC
entry. First LCC entry increases the level of competition in the overall airline industry
and has negative effect on stock return of legacy airlines. Second, the LCC entry creates
the network expansion benefit to the legacy airline and has positive effect on stock return
of legacy airlines. We test these hypotheses using both entry announcement and actual
entry dates.
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ESSAY 1
Information Content of Earnings Announcements:
Evidence from After Hours Trading

1. Introduction
After-hours trading (AHT) refers to the buying and selling of securities listed on
major exchanges outside of specified regular trading hours (RTH), which in the U.S. are
9:30-16:00. Currently, all types of investors both large and small, and institutional and
retail, can trade in one of the two AHT sessions—before market open. However, the
belief of proponents of after-hours trading that it would lead to 24-hour trading similar to
that in the Forex market has not been realized. 1 In fact, AHT on the NYSE and NASDAQ
accounts for only 3 percent of daily trading volume. 2 However, volume in after hours
trading tends to be event driven. Overnight news or world market sell-offs drive the early
session, and earnings reports drive the after-markets [Mehta, 2009]. After the London
subway attack in July 2005, 120 million shares traded in Arca's pre-open session.
Similarly, when Google posted a profit that missed Wall Street targets on January 31,
2006 for the first time, its shares went down as much as 19 percent ($70) in AHT, a $15
billion drop in market.
Obviously, understanding AHT on event days, particularly on corporate earnings
announcement days, is important for investors and regulators. Several papers study
liquidity and price discovery during AHT. Barclay and Hendershott [2003, 2004] report
1

Matt Krantz, USA Today, May 3, 2007, Investors spurn after-hours trading.

2

Special Study: Electronic Communication Networks and After-Hours Trading, June 2000.
Website http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ecnafter.htm#pt3i
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lower liquidity and thin trading volume in both before market open (BMO) and after
market close (AMC) sessions. Moreover, trades in the AMC session make smaller
contribution to price discovery than do trades during the BMO. Though they do not study
earnings announcements, these authors conjecture that earnings announcements made
after the close are likely to be associated with higher volatility and price reversals. We
directly test these conjectures.
This topic is timely because firms have increasingly been reporting earnings
outside of RTH. Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts [2006] report that only 27% of quarterly
earnings announcements occur during RTH. We believe that we are the first to study
AHT in reaction to earnings announcements made after-hours. Our study differs from
previous studies on trading over a 24-hour period (including after hours, without
conditioning on any events) such as Barclay and Hendershott [2003, 2004], and studies
on market responses during RTH to announcements made during trading and non-trading
hours (Greene and Watts [1996]). In contrast, our primary focus is to examine the
immediate reaction of liquidity and price discovery in the AHT session upon the release
of earnings news made after hours. Having the ability to trade in AHT allows investors to
react quickly to breaking news stories or fresh information. This flexibility in trading is
even more valuable when huge price swings and heavy trading are observed when a firm
either beats the street’s estimates or disappoints.
We collect every earnings announcement for every firm in the S&P 500 for 20042008. More than 95% of the announcements are made outside RTH. We address five
aspects of trading following after-hours earnings announcements. First, we present fresh
evidence concerning the AHT volume, number of trades, and trade size. Our results show
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that trading increases markedly following announcements. Therefore, we must look
beyond the very low volume that typifies AHT trading and, instead, look at event days.
Second, we examine the liquidity as measured by the quoted and effective spread. Similar
to Barclay and Hendershott [2004], spreads are typically higher during AHT when
compared with spreads during regular trading. However, following earnings
announcements spreads in AHT are often significantly lower than those on nonannouncement days. Third, we study how much of the daily price changes occur in the
AHT rather than during RTH. Following Barclay and Warner [1993], we calculate the
weighted price changes to measure price contribution from each trading period. We find
that the contributions of the BMO and AMC periods are about 36% and 60% of the price
changes, respectively. As the length of the times periods differs across BMO and AMC,
we further examine the price contribution per trade. We find that price change per trade is
higher in the BMO than in the AMC, consistent with Barclay and Hendershott [2003].
We use regression analysis to explore several characteristics of the stocks that may affect
price changes. We find that stocks with higher intraday volume and AMC
announcements have higher weighted price changes, while price changes are lower for
large cap stock and stocks listed on NYSE.
Fourth, we investigate the magnitude of public and private information in the
AHT session. We use Hasbrouck’s [1991] variance decomposition model to calculate
price discovery or trade informativeness. We hypothesize that price discovery on
earnings announcement days is higher than that of the non-announcements days during
the same AHT periods. We find a significant portion of price discovery during both BMO
and AMC sessions on announcement days, 30% and 37% for BMO and AMC
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announcements, respectively. Also, we use OLS to explore factors that potentially affect
the magnitude of price discovery in AHT. We consider a set of explanatory variables that
have been used in the previous literature to explain the magnitude of the price discovery.
We find that the magnitude of price discovery is positively correlated with trading
volume and AMC announcements. Price discovery is lower for large stocks, stocks with
higher trading cost, and stocks listed on the NYSE. We find that earnings surprises and
analysts followings do not play an important role in price discovery during AHT.
Fifth, we examine the efficiency of AHT prices, using the methodology of Biais,
Hillion, and Spatt [1999]. An efficient price indicates the convergence of prices toward
equilibrium market valuation. We find that prices in after-hours trading show a relatively
large degree of informational efficiency, which further demonstrates the importance of
price discovery in AHT as these prices are not likely to be all driven by noise trading.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. The findings may be useful
for traders, market makers in making decisions on AHT as we shed light on liquidity and
price discovery process. Regulators may find our results of interests in deciding whether
investors need greater protection during AHT. The regulatory structure, particularly in
the areas of investor protection and market integrity, needs to be current and forceful. Our
study also contributes to a broad and extensive literature on the post-earnings
announcement drift (PEAD) (Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin [1984]) as we examine the
immediate reaction to earnings releases. A recent paper by Berkman and Truong [2009]
highlights the importance of accounting for after-hours announcements for event studies
around earnings announcements. Future studies of market reaction on earnings
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announcements need to incorporate trading and price discovery in the AHT, a period
often ignored in prior literature on PEAD.

2. Literature Review
Barclay and Hendershott [2003] examine the price discovery and trading of
NASDAQ securities for the BMO, AMC and RTH. They find that during the BMO and
AMC, trading volume is very thin while trading costs and information asymmetry are
very high, and that there is a higher frequency of informed trading and more price
discovery per trade for the BMO compared to the AMC. In Barclay and Hendershott
[2004], the cost of trading measured by effective and realized spreads is larger during
BMO and AMC than during RTH. McInish, Van Ness and Van Ness [2002] study the
AHT of NYSE-listed stocks on regional exchanges. They find that most active stocks
during RTH tend to continue trading actively in AHT. Trading costs are greater in AHT
than during regular hours, trading volumes and depths are also lower in AHT. Cao,
Ghysels and Hathaway [2000] study preopening quotes as signaling for price discovery
on the NASDAQ. They find price contribution per unit time of the locked and crossed
periods is larger during the regular trading period.
However, we know of no study of AHT following earnings announcements made
outside of RTH. Previous studies focus on AHT in reaction to news during RTH or RTH
trading subsequent to announcements made after hours. Our research design allows us to
study the immediate market reactions in AHT, which has become increasingly active in
recent years. Francis, Pagach and Stephan [1992] investigate the market responses to
overnight and daytime announcements of U.S. firms. They focus on volume and price
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reaction at the open following overnight announcements. Greene and Watts [1996]
examine price discovery that occurs during RTH following earnings announcements
made both during and outside RTH. Using average transaction returns for 15-minute
intervals, they find that the majority of price responses in AHT occur within the first 15
minutes of the next day’s trading. However, NASDAQ stocks show a faster price
response to earnings announcements during RTH while price adjustment of NYSE stocks
is spread over several transactions. Berkman and Truong [2009] point out that event
studies of earnings announcements typically assign the Compustat or I/B/E/S earnings
announcement date as event day 0, which is incorrect when announcements are made
after hours. To accurately measure price changes and abnormal volume in reaction to the
after-hours earnings announcements, the event day needs to be adjusted to account for
abnormal return and volume occurring in the after-hours periods.

3. Background, Data and Sample Formation
In 1986, Instinet launched the crossing system that matched after-hours orders at
the market-closing price. AHT has been limited to high net worth investors and
institutional investors until 1999. AHT now is accessible to both institutional and retail
investors via ECNs.
We obtain intraday trades and quotes for the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from
TAQ for all firms included in the S&P500 from 2004 to 2008. Following Huang and Stoll
[1996], we exclude: trade prices, bid prices, ask prices, trade sizes and quote sizes that
are not positive; ask price <= the bid price; locked and crossed quotes; trades that are out
of sequence, involve error corrections, or nonstandard settlement (TAQ condition codes
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P,W,Z, and G); quotes that are associated with trading halts, order imbalances, or nonfirm quotes are excluded (TAQ condition codes 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, and
27); 3 quotes with spreads larger than $5; trade-to-trade and quote-to-quote price change
of more than 30%; 4 Our final sample comprises 582 stocks with 10,238 quarterly
earnings announcements. 479 of our sample stocks are NYSE-listed and 103 are
NASDAQ-listed. We collect daily prices, volumes, market capitalizations, and shares
outstanding from the CRSP. We obtain the S&P500 constituents from Compustat Index
Constituents.
Our primary source of quarterly earnings announcements is I/B/E/S, which
provides both the date and time of earnings releases. We cross check these using data
from Compustat and Bloomberg. Compustat reports the firms’ earnings release dates, but
no release time while Bloomberg only provides the exact time of earnings releases for
about 50% of our announcements. We drop announcements made during RTH.
Among the few studies on AHT, different cutoff times are used to identify the
AHT sessions: McInish, Van Ness and Van Ness [2002], 9:30-16:00 and 16:00-16:30;
Pronk [2006] 9:30–16:00 and 16:00–9:30; Barclay and Hendershott [2003], 8:00–9:30,
16:00–18:30 and 18:30-8:00; Bagnoli, Clement and Watts [2006], 5:00–9:30, 16:00–

3

We search TAQ database for trading halts related to earnings announcements; specifically,
condition code 4 for news dissemination, and 11 for news pending. There are very few halts related to
after-hours earnings announcements. Our sample has a total of 90 halts with condition code 4. No halts
with code 11 are found. In addition, halts with condition 7 (order imbalance), which is used in Jiang,
McInish, Upson (2009) are also not found. We match the earnings announcement time with the halt time.
We find that there are 7 halts during the afternoon periods while the earnings announcements are made in
the BMO. The rest are halts in the afternoons associated with the AMC announcements. Out of the 83
AMC halts, 77 halts are issued before the earnings releases and only 6 halts occurred following the
earnings releases. On average, we find that trading halts occur 16.42 minutes before earnings
announcements and trades resume within 4.30 minutes after the halt.
4

In their study, Huang and Stoll use 10% to filter data errors during regular trading hours.
According to the SEC’s special study, trades in the AHT periods tend to have higher volatility and price
changes. Therefore, we widen the band to retain more observations.
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20:30 and overnight 20:30–5:00. Our classification is very similar to Barclay and
Hendershott [2003] and we have the following four periods, 7:00–9:30, 9:30–16:00,
16:00-18:30, and 18:30–7:00. 5
Table 1 presents the distribution of earnings announcements by time of release.
Table 1, Panel A, presents the number of earnings announcements separated by primary
exchange. 50% of quarterly earnings announcements are made in the BMO session and
30% in the AMC session. Figure 1 provides a histogram of announcements by 30-minute
intervals. Clearly, most of quarterly earnings announcements are made either in BMO or
AMC sessions and companies are reluctant to release earning information during RTH.
This is consistent with Bagnoli, Clement and Watts [2006] and Berkman and Truong
[2009]. Table 1, Panel B, presents the number of announcements by year and shows that
the pattern of announcement times has been stable over our five-year sample period.

5

International markets may be open during the BMO or AMC periods. We examine the operating
hours of the 15 largest stocks markets in 2009. Only stock markets in Europe (e.g. London Stock Exchange
and Euronext) have few overlapping hours with the BMO and RTH periods while Toronto Stock Exchange
is open at the same time as in the U.S. No market is open in the AMC period. As we do not have access in
other markets, the cross-market trading is not analyzed here.
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TABLE 1
Quarterly Earnings Announcements, by Time of Day and by Year
For NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, we present the distribution of quarterly earnings
announcements (n = 10,238) by time of day (Panel A) and by year (Panel B) for the 582
stocks in the S&P500 from January 2004 to December 2008. We report four times
periods: before market open (BMO), 7:00 – 9:30; regular trading hours (RTH), 9:30 –
16:00; after market close (AMC), 16:00 – 18:30; and overnight (OVR), 18:30 – 7:00.
Panel A: Number of earnings announcements, by time of day
Time of announcement
7:00 - 9:30 BMO
9:30 - 16:00 RTH
16:00 - 18:30 AMC
18:30 - 7:00 OVR
Total

NYSE
4,508
447
1,909
1,548
8,412

Panel B: Announcements, by time of day
NYSE
Year BMO RTH AMC OVR Total
Number
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

NASDAQ
461
77
1,137
151
1,826

BMO

Total
4,969
524
3,046
1,699
10,238

NASDAQ
RTH AMC OVR

Total

835
887
918
933
935

154
107
76
60
50

353
352
407
397
400

284
315
302
322
325

1,626
1,661
1,703
1,712
1,710

77
93
103
105
83

26
15
13
14
9

225
225
220
217
250

37
40
23
24
27

365
373
359
360
369

Percentage
2004
51.4
2005
53.4
2006
53.9
2007
54.5
2008
54.7

9.5
6.4
4.5
3.5
2.9

21.7
21.2
23.9
23.2
23.4

17.5
19.0
17.7
18.8
19.0

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

21.1
24.9
28.7
29.2
22.5

7.1
4.0
3.6
3.9
2.4

61.6
60.3
61.3
60.3
67.8

10.1
10.7
6.4
6.7
7.3

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
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25

Percent

20

15

10

5

20:00

19:00

18:00

17:00

16:00

15:00

14:00

13:00

12:00

11:00

10:00

9:00

8:00

7:00

6:00

5:00

4:00

0

Time of Day

FIG. 1.—Earnings announcements, by time of day. For each 30-minute interval from
4:00 to 20:00 for the years 2004-2008, we present the percentage of earnings
announcements for S&P 500 stocks.
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics separately for announcement days and nonannouncement days and for various trading sessions. In Table 2, Panel A, we compare
and contrast BMO, AMC, and RTH. The announcement day is the day that the quarterly
earnings announcement is made, and the non-announcement days are the 10 days prior to
and the 10 days following the announcement day. 6
The number of trades and quotes are counted for each period. 7 Quoted spread is
the time weighted average of the difference of the outstanding quotes. Effective spread is
two times the volume weighted average of the absolute difference between the trade price
and the prevailing quote midpoint. Relative quoted spread is the quoted spread divided by
quote midpoint and relative effective spread is the effective spread divided by trade price.
Total volume is the number of shares in millions traded in each period and dollar volume
is the number of shares in millions multiplied by trade price. Trade size is the average
number of shares per trade and market capitalization is the average daily price times the
number of shares outstanding.
Results reported in Table 2, Panel A, show that trading activities on
announcement days are more intense across all periods compared to those on nonannouncement days. Not surprisingly, the RTH session has a much larger number of
trades and quotes than the AMC and BMO sessions, regardless of whether there is an
announcement. However, for both BMO and AMC sessions, we observe more active
trading on announcement days.

6

We do not include annual announcements in our sample as they typically fall on the same day as
the last quarterly announcement of the year.
7

Since our focus is on BMO and AMC, for brevity, we do not report activity overnight because
the trading activity is very thin. Trades and quotes before 7:00 and after 18:30 are rarely found in TAQ.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
We present descriptive statistics for stocks in the S&P500 index from January 2004 to December 2008. The earnings
announcement dates and times are from I/B/E/S. We match the stock symbols and earnings announcement days from I/B/E/S
with Compustat and Bloomberg. We obtain trade and quote data from TAQ, quarterly earnings announcements from I/B/E/S,
S&P500 constituents from Compustat and market capitalization from CRSP. Number of trades and quotes are from TAQ.
Quoted spread is the difference between the ask and bid prices, weighted by the time the quote is outstanding. Effective spread
is the absolute difference between the trade price and the prevailing quote midpoint, multiplied by two and volume weighted.
Relative quoted spread is the quoted spread divided by the quote midpoint and relative effective spread is the effective spread
divided by the trade price. Volume is number of shares traded and Dollar Volume is the number of shares traded multiplied by
the trade price. Trade size is the average number of shares per trade and market capitalization is the average daily share price
times the number of shares outstanding. Panel A presents statistics for before market open (BMO), 7:00–9:30; regular trading
hour (RTH), 9:30–16:00; and after market close (AMC), 16:00–18:30 on the announcement and non-announcement days. The
announcement day is the day that quarterly earnings announcement is made, and the non-announcement days are 10 days prior
to and 10 days following the announcement day. Panel B and C report statistics for quartiles ranked by dollar volume for BMO
and AMC on announcement days.
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TABLE 2 – Continued
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Announcement Days and Non-Announcement Days for Various Periods.
Number of
Spread
Volume*
Dollar
Trade
Periods
Trades Quotes Quoted† Effective† Relative†† Rel.Eff.††
Volume** Size
BMO Announcement
159
592
136.30
39.09
3.95
1.15
133
3,878 2,716
NonAnnouncement
44
267
169.57
60.27
4.75
1.59
55
1,807 9,255
AMC Announcement
563
1,597
115.85
32.13
3.17
0.89
512
17,698 11,592
NonAnnouncement
20
194
121.95
34.24
3.34
0.94
219
8,078 15,580
RTH Announcement 16,677 109,913
11.43
5.20
0.29
0.14
7,230
249,683
546
NonAnnouncement 10,544 83,382
14.16
7.48
0.35
0.19
3,985
137,763
452
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics on Announcement Days for BMO for Quartiles ranked by Dollar Volume
Quartile
Number of
Spread
Volume*
Dollar
Trades
Quotes
Quoted† Effective† Relative†† Rel.Eff.††
Volume**
1
6
98
180.36
43.47
5.44
1.46
2
63
2
28
280
149.02
41.96
4.74
1.32
16
352
3
75
364
125.07
39.99
3.35
1.04
47
1,603
4
526
1,629
90.86
30.94
2.28
0.78
468
13,512

Trade
Size
500
1,537
2,298
6,532

Panel C: Descriptive Statistics on Announcement Days for AMC Quartiles ranked by Dollar Volume
Quartile
Number of
Spread
Volume*
Dollar
Trades
Quotes
Quoted† Effective† Relative†† Rel.Eff.††
Volume**
1
17
122
121.49
29.55
4.38
1.06
62
1,558
2
29
187
134.04
33.43
3.28
0.89
104
3,702
3
71
305
134.74
34.85
3.38
0.82
235
7,364
4
2,133
5,762
73.15
30.65
1.67
0.79
1,645
58,050

Trade
Size
6,315
9,552
13,872
16,551

†cents
††%
*million shares
**million dollars
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Quoted spread and relative spread are proxies for trading costs. We find that
trading costs are higher in the BMO and AMC compared with those in RTH. As reported
by Barclay and Hendershott [2004], the effective spread and realized spread are much
larger in the AHT than in RTH. However, when we compare the spreads on
announcement and non-announcement days, we find that quoted spread and effective
spread are smaller on the announcement days. The relative spread and relative effective
spread that are the respective spreads scaled by price are also smaller on the
announcement days.
Consistent with the intuition, trading volume on announcement days is higher
than on non-announcement days. Investors clearly react immediately to the arrival of new
information. Also, the average trade size in AMC and BMO on announcement days is
smaller than on the non-announcement days. This is consistent with the stealth trading
hypothesis of Barclay and Warner [1993]. Despite the fact that the earning release is
public information, informed traders still want to strategically fragmenting their orders to
minimize the price impact.
Statistics for quartiles ranked by dollar volume are reported in Table 2, Panels B
and C. Stocks in the thickest quartile show significantly more active trading than stocks
in the lower quartiles. We also scale the quoted spread and effect spread by stock price
and find that spreads are lower for more actively traded stocks.
Figure 2 presents trading volume by minute over the entire trading day. We
aggregate the trading volume for each 30-minute interval for each stock and report
average volume for announcement days and non-announcement days. We observe that
trading volume on the announcement days is consistently higher during the entire day.
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We see the spikes of volume in the morning and afternoon for both groups. Figure 2
shows the familiar U-shape pattern of trading volume reported by McInish and Wood
[1990]. Figure 3 displays number of trades and dollar volumes for each 30-minute
interval before and after the earnings announcements is made. The first 30 minutes after
the announcement is period 0. We report the total number of trades during each 30
minutes. Dollar volume is trading price multiplied by volume. We aggregate the data for
each stock in each interval and average across all stocks. In general, before earnings are
released to public, investors are reluctant to take positions. Reactions are immediate after
the announcements as trades are heavily concentrated in the first 30-minutes after
announcements. The patterns for BMO and AMC differ. Figure 3, Panels A and B,
present the BMO data. After announcements both number of trades and dollar volume
increase dramatically. Trading activity remains heightened as the market open
approaches. Figure 3, Panels C and D, the AMC data show a peak during the first 30
minutes after the announcement, with trading intensity declining slowly in subsequent
intervals. Both trade count and volume remain higher throughout the AMC.
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FIG. 2. – Daily trading volume, by time of day. For firms in the S&P500 for the years
2004 to 2008, we plot average daily trading volume for announcement days and nonannouncement days by thirty-minute interval from 4:00 to 20:00. Trading volumes are
aggregated first by day, then by stock, and then across stocks. We obtain trading data
from TAQ and announcement days from I/B/E/S. The non-announcements days are the
10 days before and 10 days after the announcement.
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Panel A. Number of trades for BMO sample
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Panel B. Dollar volume for BMO sample
FIG. 3. – Number of trades and dollar volume around the time of earnings
announcements. We present the number of trades and dollar volumes for each 30-minute
interval around the earnings announcement times for a sample of the firms included in
S&P500 from 2004 to 2008. We obtain trading data from TAQ and announcement days
from I/B/E/S. We define the first 30 minutes after the announcement time as period 0.
The number of trades is counted from the beginning to the end of each interval. The
dollar volume is trading price multiplied by volume. We summarize the data for each
stock in each interval and average across stocks. Panels A and B demonstrate the number
of trades and dollar volumes in thousands for BMO sample while Panels C and D present
those of the AMC sample.
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Panel C. Number of trades for AMC sample
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FIG. 3. – Continued
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4. Research Methodologies

4.1 WEIGHTED PRICE CONTRIBUTION (WPC)
To study the effect of earning announcements on price discovery, we use the
weighted price contribution (WPC) of Barclay and Warner [1993]. WPC computes the
fraction of price changes during a given period relative to price changes over a 24-hour
period stock return (close-to-close). Barclay and Warner [1993] use the WPC to examine
price changes associated with trades of different sizes and to identify which trade size
moves prices. Cao, Ghysels and Hatheway [2000] use relative time-weighted price
contribution (RTWPC) to study the contribution of pre-opening to the daily price change
and contribution of the crossed and locked period on the NASDAQ. They partition the
preopening and trading hours into five periods including pre-cross/lock, lock, cross, postcross/lock and trading period. The price contribution of each period is scaled by the
length of trading time in each period. Barclay and Hendershott [2003] study the price
discovery of AHT on 250 stocks with the largest trading volumes on NASDAQ. In sum,
WPC has been widely used in the literature to measure magnitude of price discovery in
different trading periods. Using WPC, we can compare the level of price discovery across
periods. In addition, weighted price contribution per trade (WPCT) can be used to
appropriately account for the low amount of trades during market close.
Following Barclay and Hendershott [2003], we compute WPC as
S

S

s=1

s=1

WPCi = ∑[(|rets|/ ∑|rets|)·(reti,s/rets)]

(1)

WPCi is the weighted price contribution in period i. reti,s is the log-return during the
period i for the stock s.
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We calculate WPC over a number of periods. The return from announcement to
the end of day is the log return from the first trade after the announcement time to the last
trade of the day before 18:30. The return for BMO is log return from the first trade that
occurs after 7:00 to the opening trade at 9:30. The regular trading day return is the log
return of first trade at 9:30 to the last trade at 16:00. rets is calculated as the
announcement-to-close price of the same day (next day) for BMO (AMC)
announcements. WPC is calculated for the full sample of all qualified stocks as well as
for NYSE and NASDAQ-list stocks.
We also use the WPCT calculated as
S

S

WPCTi = WPCi /∑[(|rets|/ ∑|rets|)·(nti,s/nts)]
s=1

(2)

s=1

where nti,s is the number of trades in each time period i for stock s. For BMO (AMC), we
define nts as the total number of trades from the announcement time to the close of the
same day (next day). Barclay and Hendershott [2003] argue that WPCT will be close to
one if all trades are equally informative because it is the fraction of the total price change
divided by the fraction of trades that occurs in a given time period.

4.2. PRICE DISCOVERY FROM PRIVATE INFORMATION
Hasbrouck [1991a] proposes the vector autoregressive (VAR) model to measure
the impact of a trade on price due to asymmetry information and proportion of private
information inferred from a trade. The idea of the model is that the market-maker revises
his bid and ask quotes following a trade to adjust for information content of trade. Based
on the direction of trade, the market-maker adjusts new quotes to reflect the true value of
the stock. The VAR model measures how private information is impounded into asset
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prices through trades. Hasbrouck [1991a] assume the true value of a stock is the
midpoint, pt, which consists of a random-walk component mt and a stationary component,
st: pt = mt + st, where mt = mt-1 + vt and vt is assumed to be normal distribution with zero
mean and constant variance. E(vt,vs) = 0 for t≠s. The random walk component (mt) is
referred to as the permanent component of the price and the stationary component (st) as
the transitory component of the price. Variances of the error terms are defined as
2

2

VAR(ν1,t) = E(ε1,t) and VAR(ν2,t) = E(ε2,t). The variance of the permanent price change
can be decomposed into price change caused by the arrival of public information and by
private information. The VAR model is
p

p

i=1

i=0

p

p

i=1

i=1

rt = ∑ai rt-i + ∑bi xt-i + ν1,t
xt = ∑ci rt-i + ∑di xt-i + ν2,t

(3a)

(3b)

where a’s, b’s, c’s and d’s are coefficients of lagged terms of quote returns and trade
directions, and v1,t and v2,t are the disturbance. xt is direction of trade (+1 for buy and -1
for sell order) and rt is the log return of quote midpoint change following a trade. Note
that the contemporaneous value of xt is included in equation (3a) as the revision of the
quote follows the trade but not vice versa. The VAR model can be inverted into vector
moving average (VMA) representation as shown in Hasbrouck [1991b] 8. The coefficients
of the lag polynomials in the VMA representation are the impulse response functions
implied by the VAR. The proportion of private information from trades can be obtained
from the variance decomposition method. Under the assumption of invertability, a linear

8

We thank Joel Hasbrouck for providing SAS code on his website.
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function of quotes return and trades can be expressed in VMA representation. The VMA
coefficients are calculated by inverting VAR model to
∞

∞

i=1

i=0

rt = (ν1,t +∑ai*ν1,t-i )+ ∑bi*ν2,t-i
∞

∞

i=1

i=1

xt = ∑ci*ν1,t-i + (ν2,t + ∑di*ν2,t-i)

(4a)

(4a)

Following Hasbrouck [1991b], we decompose the variance of the random-walk
component of the quote changes into the change caused by the arrival of public
information and private information from the following equation.
2
σw
∞

∞

=

2 2
(∑ai) σν1
i=0

∞

2 2

+ (∑bi) σν2

(5)

i=0

2

The value of ( ∑bi) represents the component of price discovery from private
i=0

information revealed through trades. Variance decomposition technique is applied to data
of BMO and AMC announcements. In theory, the lagged terms can be of infinite order
but in empirical test, the lagged terms are truncated. Barclay and Hendershott [2003]
estimate the VAR system using 10 lag terms and VMA using 20 lags and we do likewise.
To estimate the model, we require our sample stocks to have a minimum of 50
trades and quotes from the announcement time to 9:30 for BMO and from the
announcement time to 18:30 for AMC on the announcement days. Following Hasbrouck
[1991b], we use the last quote if there is more than one quote with the same time stamp.
Trades with the same time stamp and same price are combined into one transaction. If a
quote update occurs within 5 seconds following a trade, it is assigned the same time
subscript t. We use the prevailing quote midpoint outstanding prior to the trade arrival. If
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the trade price is above (below) the prevailing quote midpoint, it is a buy (sell). We lag
trades by 1 second as suggested by Henker and Wang [2006].

5. Empirical Results

5.1. WEIGHTED PRICE CONTRIBUTION (WPC)
Table 3 presents the WPC for the BMO and AMC. In Table 3, Panel A, we report
the WPC for the BMO announcement from the announcement time to market open (9:30)
and from the market open (9:30) to the market close (16:00) to demonstrate the overall
picture of price change effect from the time of announcement. WPC is 36% over the
period from the announcement time to the opening price. The larger portion is
contributed by the trades during RTH.
In Table 3, Panel B, that for AMC announcements, 56% of the WPC is from the
announcement time to the opening price the next trading day. Unlike the BMO
announcements, investors have more time if the announcement is made in AMC before
the next day’s RTH. Investors who have access to AHT act upon the news before RTH of
the next day.
We also examine NYSE and NASDAQ stocks separately. For BMO
announcements, we find that 36%-40% of WPC is from the announcement time to the
opening price while the larger portion of WPC is contributed from RTH trades. For AMC
announcements, 47%-64% of WPC is from the announcement time to the next day’s
opening price. The large price change for the AMC announcements is consistent with
Cliff, Cooper and Gulen [2008] who document that the return overnight is the primary
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source of U.S. equity premium with the exception that we condition on the stock prices
response when the quarterly earnings are made public
Since the AMC announcement has longer time for investors to react, we examine
the WPC for three sub-periods in greater detail. Most of price contribution comes
immediately after the announcement and by the end of the AMC session 42-51% of price
change has occurred. The WPC from the overnight return and BMO of the next day are
minimal. Trading during the subsequent RTH contributes the remaining WPC.
Our results differ from Barclay and Hendershott [2003] who report that the price
changes in BMO are larger than AMC and that the largest portion of 24-hour price
change (close-to-close) is from the RTH. We believe that these differences can be
attributed to the fact that we examine the price change on the earnings announcements
days while Barclay and Hendershott [2003] study the overall after-hours periods without
conditioning on any informational event. In addition, we focus on the price change due to
the earnings announcement; therefore, the total return of the event day (rets) is not exactly
a close-to-close return, but the price change from the earnings announcement time to the
close.
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TABLE 3
Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) and Weighted Price Contribution per Trade
(WPCT) for BMO and AMC Announcements
We examine the weighted price contribution (WPC) and weighted price contribution per
trade (WPCT) for BMO and AMC announcements for S&P500 stocks during 2004 to
2008. BMO announcements occur from 7:00 to 9:30 and AMC announcements occur
from 16:00 to 18:30. For BMO announcements, we measure the price contribution from
(1) the announcement time to 9:30, and (2) 9:30 to 16:00. For AMC announcements, we
measure the price contribution from (1) the announcement time to 18:30, (2) 7:00 to 9:30,
and (3) 9:30 to 16:00. The WPC for period i is:
S

S

s=1

s=1

WPCi = ∑[(|rets|/ ∑|rets|)·(reti,s/rets)]

(1)

Where reti,s is the log return during period i for the stock s. rets is calculated as the
announcement-to-close price of t = 0, nts is the total number of trades from the
announcement time to the close on t = 0 and nti,s is the number of trades in each time
period i for stock s. The WPCT for period i is:
S

S

WPCTi = WPCi /∑[(|rets|/ ∑|rets|)·(nti,s/nts)]
s=1

(2)

s=1

In each case, we present results for the entire sample and for the NYSE and NASDAQ
stocks. The WPC results for BMO and AMC announcements are presented in Panels A
and B and the WPCT results for BMO and AMC are presented in Panels C and D,
respectively.
Panel A: WPC for BMO announcements
Price contribution period
Announcement
to 9:30
9:30 to 16:00
Entire
0.36
0.64
Sample
NYSE
0.36
0.64
NASDAQ

0.40

Panel B: WPC for AMC announcements
Announcement
to 18:30
7:00 to 9:30
Entire
0.42
0.14
sample
NYSE
0.32
0.15
NASDAQ

0.51

0.13
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0.60

9:30 to 16:00
0.40
0.47
0.33
(Continued)

TABLE 3 – Continued
Panel C. WPCT for BMO announcements
Price contribution period
Announcement
to 9:30
9:30 to 16:00
Entire
45.05
0.64
sample
NYSE
57.26
0.65
NASDAQ

20.44

Panel D. WPCT for AMC announcements
Announcement
to 18:30
7:00 to 9:30
Entire
10.11
9.61
sample
NYSE
20.76
26.82
NASDAQ

7.68

5.65
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0.61

9:30 to 16:00
0.42
0.48
0.36

Next, we present the results of WPCT for the same sample for the BMO and AMC
announcements in Table 3, Panels C and D. Barclay and Hendershott [2003] argue that
the value of WPCT will be close to one if every trade conveys equal information. We find
a similar pattern that WPCT of AHT are greater than one across all sample and subperiods, compared with WPCT less than one during RTH. In contrast to the WPC results,
trading in BMO is more informative than AMC when measured per trade. The WPCT of
BMO sample is 45 while it is only 10 for the AMC sample. Even though the length of
BMO is shorter, trades are more likely from informed traders. Holden and Subramanyam
[1992] present a model in which informed investors facing competition want to use their
private information as quickly as possible.
Since we find that WPC in the AHT sessions are relatively high compared to the
RTH for the announcement day, this should not be the case for days without significant
informational events such as earnings announcements. To verify this, we compare WPC
on announcements days and several days before and after the announcement day. We
examine whether the WPC on event days are significantly different from other days, and
report the results in Table 4.
The WPC of the announcement day is denoted as day 0. Five days prior to the
event are denoted as [-5] to [-1] and five days following the event are [+1] to [+5]. For
brevity, we report the results for the announcement day, denoted as [0], one day prior to
and following the announcement, denoted as [-1] and [+1], and the average of price
discovery for two to five days prior to and following the announcement, denoted as [-2 to
-5] and [+2 to +5], respectively. As there are no exact starting and ending times for AHT
on the non-announcement days, we calculate the price contribution based on the entire
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period. Specifically, for the BMO sample, WPC is calculated for 7:00-9:30 and 9:3016:00. For the AMC sample, WPC is calculated for 16:00-18:30, 7:00-9:30, and 9:3016:00. We find that for both BMO and AMC samples, the price contributions in the AHT
periods are significantly larger only on announcement days. For the BMO sample, the
WPC surrounding the announcement days ranges from 16% to 24% while the largest
contributions are from the RTH period. Similarly, for the AMC sample, WPCs during the
AMC periods, and BMO periods of the following day are significantly smaller than that
of the announcement day. The WPC in the AMC period is from 2% to 8% and BMO
period from 1% to 6%. The significance level of price contribution is derived from the
RTH. Thus, the results are consistent with our earlier notion that information
environments are very different in AHT trading when material information is released
after hours.
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TABLE 4
Robustness Test of WPC around the Earnings Announcement Days
We estimate the weighted price contribution for the announcement days and 5 days prior
and 5 days after. We include only stocks that have sufficient trades to compute WPC in
the BMO and AMC sessions during 5 days surrounding the announcement date. For
brevity, we present the result for day 0, -1, +1, the average of days -2 to -5 and the
average of days +2 to +5. Panel A presents the results for BMO announcement sample
and Panel B presents the results for AMC announcement sample.
Panel A: WPC surrounding the BMO announcements
7:00 to 9:30
Day
[-2 to -5]
[-1]

WPC
0.17
0.18

[0]

0.36

[+1]
[+2 to +5]

0.21
0.21

t-stat
20.99**
17.88**

[-2 to -5]
[-1]

0.04
0.04

[0]

0.42

[+1]
[+2 to +5]

0.03
0.03

∗Significant

t-stat
36.29**
32.02**

0.02
0.01

15.25**
22.10**

t-stat
5.78**
6.44**

0.14
45.39**
50.21**

0.01
0.03

at the 0.05 level
at the 0.01 level

∗∗Significant
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WPC
0.83
0.82

t-stat
-4.11**
-3.16**

0.64

Panel B: WPC surrounding theAMC announcements
16:00 to 18:30
7:00 to 9:30
Day

9:30 to 16:00

0.80
0.79

-2.90**
-2.39*

9:30 to 16:00
0.79
0.81

t-stat
-4.33**
-5.80**

0.40
6.53**
2.89**

0.81
0.84

-5.11**
-6.78**

5.2. CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON WEIGHTED PRICE
CONTRIBUTION
To gain insights on the factors that influence the magnitude of WPC, we perform
a cross-sectional analysis to examine the relation between WPC and several
characteristics of the stocks. Foster, Olsen and Shevlin [1984] show that firms with a
greater number of analysts following experience higher abnormal price changes. Barclay
and Hendershott [2008] regress WPC on the fraction of trading activity in the BMO and
also on variables such as log market capitalization and daily dollar volume that control
for stock characteristics. They report a higher price contribution following unexpectedly
high pre-open trading volume. Greene and Watts [1996] report that stocks react
differently to earnings announcements made during the different time periods. For the
announcements in the non-trading period, price changes occur immediately when the
market opens. The adjustment is smoother for the RTH announcements. Similarly,
Masulis and Srivakumar [2002] find that NASDAQ stock prices can adjust faster than
NYSE/AMEX stocks on the event of seasoned stock offering. Barclay and Hendershott
[2003] find that the BMO session has a higher level of price contribution per trade than
AMC.
Consistent with the approach in the prior literature, we include the number of
analysts, earnings surprises, daily dollar volume and market capitalization in our
regression. We include the dummy variables to control for the time of announcements,
and primary listing exchanges.

42

We use WPC, the proportion of individual return from earnings announcements to
the total price change, as the dependent variable. We estimate the following OLS
regression.
WPC = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size +
β5AMC + β6NYSE + ε

(6)

where Analysts is the number of analysts following a stock reported in I/B/E/S details
files for each quarter. Surprise is the difference of actual earnings and average analysts
forecast for each quarter of each stock divided by the standard deviation of analyst
estimates. Volume is the average log value of one-month daily trading volume prior to the
announcement date. Firm_Size is the average log value of market capitalization a month
before the announcement day. AMC is a control variable for the announcement period.
AMC is 1 for AMC and 0 for BMO. NYSE is a control variable for the primary exchange
of the sample stocks. NYSE is 1 for NYSE-listed stocks and 0 for NASDAQ-listed
stocks.
The regression results are reported in Table 5. We report four alternative
specifications. Analysts is significantly positive only in the first model. Surprise is not
statistically significant across all models. Our findings differ from the results on PEAD
phenomenon, which shows that the returns over the longer term are closely related to the
direction and the magnitude of the earnings surprises. Volume has a strong positive
impact on WPC. On the contrary Firm_Size has a significant negative impact on the WPC
in AHT. The results are robust across all models. Additionally, we find that AMC and
NYSE also are significant. The dummy for AMC shows a significant positive relation to
the WPC in both models 2 and 4, indicating that the earnings announcements made in
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AMC have higher price changes. The coefficients for primary exchange are negative,
indicating that stocks listed on NYSE tend to have lower WPC. This is in line with
Masulis and Shivakumar [2002] who also report that NYSE stocks have slower price
adjustment than those on NASDAQ.

5.3. PRICE DISCOVERY FROM PRIVATE INFORMATION
We examine price discovery based on the methodology proposed in Hasbrouck
[1991a, b]. We use trades and quotes of AHT from TAQ database to estimate the fraction
of price discovery from private information for AMC and BMO announcements. We only
include earnings announcements occurring during AMC and BMO periods. Hasbrouck
[1991b] restricts his sample firms to have at least 500 observations in shorter trading
periods for intraday analysis. 9 We do the same because AHT is usually very thin
compared to the RTH. Many stocks have no trading activity recorded on TAQ before
9:30 and after 16:00. Since the model requires lagged values of trades and quote based
returns, we need to have a sufficient number of trades and quotes to obtain meaningful
results. We apply a stricter rule to ensure that there are sufficient observations to estimate
the model. First, a stock must have at least 50 trades and quotes on the earnings
announcement days. In the TAQ database, quotes sometimes occur without any trades or
trades without quote during the pre-market or after-close. For comparison purpose, we
have to estimate the price discovery for the stocks around announcement days. We
therefore impose the second filter that there must be sufficient observations to estimate
the results around the announcement day. For non-announcement days, some stocks have

9

Hasbrouck (1991b, p.589).
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no trading activity at all. The wider the window is, the fewer observations we obtain.
Therefore, we choose to examine a 5-day window before and after the announcement
days.
In Table 6, we present the price discovery results for AHT following earnings
announcements. We find that price discovery during the BMO period is 29.9% and AMC
is 37.0%. We also report the level of price discovery for groups ranked by dollar trading
volume in AHT. We find a positive relationship between trading volume and price
discovery. For the BMO announcements, we find a slight increase in price discovery with
trading volume from the lowest group at 28.0% to the highest group at 32.5%. For the
AMC announcements, we find a stronger relationship as price discovery increases from
34.4% for the lowest trading volume group to 39.2% for the most actively traded group.
Although there seem to be a significant amount of price discovery from private
information through AHT on announcement days, we are interested in understanding
whether more active price discovery occurs on event days (as opposed to AHT on nonevent days). To address this issue, we compare and contrast the price discovery on the
event days and non-event days and report the results in Table 7. The price discovery of
the announcement day is denoted as day 0. We examine five days prior to the event and
five days following the event. For brevity, we report the result for the announcement day,
denoted as [0], one day prior to and following the announcement, denoted as [-1] and
[+1], and the average of price discovery for two to five days prior to and following the
announcement, denoted as [-2 to -5] and [+2 to +5], respectively. Because there are no
exact starting and ending times for AHT on the non-announcement days, we use two
alternative ways to consider matching the time period with those on announcement days.
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TABLE 5
Cross-sectional Analysis of Weighted Price Contribution (WPC)
We report results of the regression of WPC against explanatory variables. The WPC for
period i is:
S

S

s=1

s=1

WPCi = ∑[(|rets|/ ∑|rets|)·(reti,s/rets)]

(1)

Where reti,s is the log return during period i for the stock s. rets is calculated as the
announcement-to-close price of t = 0. The regression is:
WPC = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size +
β5AMC + β6NYSE + ε

(6)

where Analysts is the number of analysts following a firm reported in I/B/E/S details files
for each quarter. Surprise is the difference between actual earnings and average analysts
forecast for each quarter for each stock divided by the standard deviation of analyst
estimates. Volume is the average log value of daily trading volume one month prior to the
announcement day. Firm_Size is the average log value of market capitalization one
month before the announcement day. Two dummy variables are used. AMC is a control
variable that equals 1 for AMC and 0 for BMO announcements. NYSE equals 1 for
NYSE-listed stocks and 0 for NASDAQ-listed stocks.
Independent
Variables
Intercept
Analysts
Surprises
Volume
Firm_Size

1
0.0439
6.05***
0.0003
3.39***
0.0107
0.67
0.0043
9.05***
-0.0058
-11.95***

AMC

2
0.0288
4.01***
0.0000
-0.15
0.0085
0.54
0.0033
6.93***
-0.0040
-8.16***
0.0149
15.56***

NYSE
∗∗∗Significant

3
0.0486
6.75***
0.0001
1.01
0.0013
0.08
0.0031
6.34***
-0.0042
-8.39***

-0.0119
-10.60***
at the 0.01 level
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4
0.0336
4.67***
-0.0001
-1.08
0.0032
0.20
0.0027
5.55***
-0.0033
-6.55***
0.0129
12.86***
-0.0071
-6.10***

First, we estimate the price discovery based on the entire period, that is, trades and quotes
from 7:00 to 9:30 for BMO and 16:00 to 18:30 for AMC. Second, we use the time of
announcement to the end of the respective AHT trading sessions for the ten-day window
surrounding the event. We find similar patterns of price discovery except in a few cases.
Hence, we present the results based on the sample using the entire period of the AHT
session. We confirm that price discovery is the highest on earnings announcement days.
As reported in Table 6, for the BMO announcement, price discovery during the period
from announcement time to before market open is about 29.9%. For the AMC, price
discovery is 37.0%. The highest percentage of price discovery is also found for NYSE
and NASDAQ sub-samples on the announcement days. Other days surrounding the
events are noticeably lower. T-statistics and the significance levels of standard paired ttest are presented. The price discovery on the announcement day is significantly different
from other days. Figure 4 depicts the price discovery on each day over the 11-day
window (the announcement day, 5 days before, and 5 days after). In general, BMO
sessions have relatively higher price discovery than the AMC sessions. Except on the
announcement day, the price discovery for the AMC session is higher than BMO. This is
quite consistent with the fact that overnight news in the world markets and scheduled
macroeconomic news releases often drive the early session and provide investors
incentives to trade during BMO.
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TABLE 6
Price Discovery for BMO and AMC Announcements
We report the price discovery for earnings announcement of stocks listed in S&P500
during 2004 to 2008. We define price discovery as the proportion of private information
to total information. We use method proposed by Hasbrouck [1991a] to measure price
discovery. Our model uses quote revisions, the log return of mid-quote change, and
signed trades. Trades are lagged for 1 second to match the prevailing quote. Due to lack
of trading activity during the after- hours sessions, we restrict the sample stocks to have a
minimum of 50 trades and quotes from the announcement time to 9:30 for BMO and
from the announcement time to 18:30 for AMC announcements. Following Barclay and
Hendershott [2003], we use 20 lags. For the AMC and BMO announcements, in turn, we
report results for the overall sample and for quartiles based on after-hours trading
volume. F-statistics for testing the null hypothesis of equal means among the four
quartiles are provided in italic.
Trading volume
quartiles

Announcement
BMO

AMC
Price discovery

Overall

0.299

0.370

1 (thin)
2
3
4 (thick)
F-statistics

0.280
0.291
0.299
0.325
2.07**

0.344
0.356
0.389
0.392
3.53**

**

Significant at the 0.05 level
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0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
Mean

0.15

Median

0.1
0.05
0
-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Panel A. BMO announcements
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2

Mean
Median

0.15
0.1
0.05
0
-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Panel B. AMC announcements

FIG. 4.–Price discovery around BMO and AMC announcements. We estimate the ratio
of private information to total information using the approach of Hasbrouck [1991a, b].
For BMO and AMC announcements, we plot the means and medians of this ratio
estimated for the announcement day and for 5-days before and after the earnings
announcement.
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TABLE 7
Robustness Test of Price Discovery around the Earnings Announcement Days
We estimate the price discovery for the announcement days and 5 days prior and 5 days
after. We use the method proposed by Hasbrouck [1991a] to measure price discovery.
Our model uses quote revisions, the log return of mid-quote change, and signed trades.
Trades are lagged for 1 second to match the prevailing quote. We require sample stocks
to have a minimum of 50 trades and quotes from the announcement time to 9:30 (18:30)
for BMO (AMC). Following Barclay and Hendershott [2003], we use 20 lags. Panel A
presents the results for the overall sample. For brevity, we present the results for day 0,
-1, +1, the average of days -2 to -5 and the average of days +2 to +5. Panels B and C
present the results for NYSE-listed stocks and NASDAQ-listed stocks, respectively.
Day

BMO
t-stat
AMC
Panel A. Overall sample

t-stat

[-2 to -5]

0.231

5.56***

0.180

29.79***

[-1]
[0]

0.232
0.299

4.08***

0.216
0.370

16.84***

[+1]

0.247

3.36***

0.205

19.91***

[+2 to +5]

0.226

6.12***

0.173

31.18***

Panel B. NYSE-listed stocks
[-2 to -5]

0.255

3.81***

0.225

8.19***

[-1]
[0]

0.257
0.313

2.58***

0.246
0.331

4.45***

[+1]

0.263

2.45**

0.233

5.83***

[+2 to +5]

0.226

6.12***

0.173

31.18***

Panel C. NASDAQ-listed stocks
[-2 to -5]

0.202

4.06***

0.166

33.04***

[-1]
[0]

0.200
0.28

3.22***

0.203
0.393

18.22***

[+1]

0.229

2.28**

0.192

20.90***

[+2 to +5]

0.194

4.59***

0.165

33.45***

∗∗Significant

at the 0.05 level
at the 0.01 level

∗∗∗Significant
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5.4 CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON PRICE DISCOVERY
Price discovery varies cross sectionally. In this section, we examine the
relationship between price discovery subsequent to after-hours earnings announcement
and several explanatory variables. Atiase [1985] finds that a firm’s size has a negative
relation to unexpected earnings. He argues that large firms have more pre-disclosure
information available to investors. As a result, reaction to the actual earnings
announcements is lower. Shores [1990] uses a firm’s size and number of analysts to
proxy for interim information and find a negative relation between market reactions and
firm’s size and number of analysts. Gleason and Lee [2003] report a faster price
adjustment subsequent to announcements for stocks that receive greater analyst coverage.
Turning to PEAD, Foster, Olsen and Shevlin [1984] find that the sign and
magnitude of unexpected earnings can affect price changes. Obviously earnings surprises
play an important role in PEAD when measured over the longer time period (5 days to
quarters). However, previous studies do not consider the impact of earnings surprises on
price discovery during AHT.
Libby, Mathieu and Robb [2002] find that spreads are relatively wider following
earnings announcements on the Toronto Stock Exchange. In contrast, Pronk [2006] finds
that spreads are narrower for NYSE and AMEX firms. We include the spread during
AHT following earnings announcements to test whether the spread is related to price
discovery. Trading volume around the earnings announcement is also important. While
McInish, Van Ness and Van Ness [2002] report that actively traded stocks tend to be
active in the after-hours, abnormal volume are usually observed on the event day
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(Garfinkel and Sokobin [2006]). Thus, we adopt the average daily trading volume to
distinguish these effects from the firm’s size.
Timing of announcement can make a difference. Prior research shows that stock
prices react differently to earnings announcements made during the trading hours and
when market is closed (Francis, Pagach and Stephan [1992]). Barclay and Hendershott
[2003] find that the BMO session experiences higher level of price discovery than AMC.
Lastly, difference in market structure between the NYSE and NASDAQ can also affect
price discovery. Greene and Watts [1996] and Masulis and Shivakumar [2002] report that
market structure causes the price adjustments on NASDAQ to be different from that on
NYSE.
We employ linear regression to examine relationship between the price discovery
and explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the price discovery of AHT
following earnings announcements. Most of the independent variables are the same as
defined in section 5.2.We include an additional determinant, AHspread, which is the
relative effective spread of the corresponding AHT session on the announcement day.
Price discovery = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size +
β5AHspread + β6AMC + β7NYSE + ε

(7)

The OLS regression results reported in Table 8 indicate that Analysts and Surprise
do not play an important role in price discovery in the short run. We find that daily
Volume and Firm_Size are significant determinants of price discovery. The positive
relation between Volume and price discovery lends support to the previous findings of the
abnormal volume on the announcement day. The volume can be from informed traders
who possess private information and wish to capitalize on their informational advantage
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in a timely fashion. Firm_Size has a negative relation with price discovery following the
earnings announcements in AHT. In addition, we examine the liquidity effect during the
AHT on price discovery by using the relative effective spread from the corresponding
AHT session. Negative coefficients of after-hours spreads support the notion that market
friction lowers the price discovery since spreads are interpreted as trading costs to
investors. Higher spread is obviously an indication of friction to investors who wish to
trade the stocks in AHT and hinders price discovery process in non-normal trading hours.
We obtain consistent results from AMC and NYSE dummy variables across
different regressions. The dummy AMC shows positive and significant coefficients,
which indicates that earnings announcements made during AMC are associated with a
higher level of price discovery than those made in BMO period. The coefficient for
dummy NYSE is significantly negative, meaning that stocks that are listed on NYSE
obtain lower price discovery than those listed on NASDAQ.
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TABLE 8
Regression Analysis of Price Discovery
We present the results of the regression of price discovery on our independent variables
for earnings announcement of stocks listed in S&P500 during 2004 to 2008. We use
method proposed by Hasbrouck [1991a] to measure price discovery. Our model uses
quote revisions, the log return of mid-quote change, and signed trades. Trades are lagged
for 1 second to match the prevailing quote. We estimate the following regression model:
Price discovery = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size +
β5AHspread + β6AMC + β7NYSE + ε

(7)

where Analysts is the number of analysts following a firm reported in I/B/E/S details files
for each quarter. Surprise is the difference between actual earnings and average analysts
forecast for each quarter for each stock divided by the standard deviation of analyst
estimates. Volume is the average log value of one-month daily trading volume prior to the
announcement day. Firm_Size is the average log value of one-month market
capitalization before the announcement day. AHspread is the relative effective spread of
the corresponding after-hour period on the announcement day. AMC is a control variable
that equals 1 for AMC and 0 for BMO announcements. NYSE equals 1 for NYSE-listed
stocks and 0 for NASDAQ-listed stocks. We combine the AMC and BMO
announcements. We estimate the model separately for AMC announcements and for
BMO announcements. The t-statistics of the coefficients are reported in italic.
Independent Variables
Intercept

1
-0.1332
-1.34
0.0013
1.47
-0.0945
-0.74
0.0413
4.56***
-0.0215
-2.76***

Analysts
Surprise
Volume
Firm_Size
AHspread
AMC

0.0632
4.57***
-0.0521
-4.61***

NYSE
∗∗∗Significant

at the 0.01 level
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2
-0.0551
-0.54
0.0012
1.36
-0.0749
-0.59
0.0391
4.32***
-0.0232
-2.98***
-0.0114
-3.13***
0.0679
4.90***
-0.0475
-4.18***

5.5 THE EFFICIENCY OF PRICE DISCOVERY AFTER EARNINGS
ANNOUNCEMENT
RHT is very different from AHT trading. Lack of liquidity and high trading costs
can impede efficient price discovery. AHT costs can be large and create high temporary
price impact (Barclay and Hendershott [2003]). Trading prices around earnings
announcements moment tend to be noisy due to investors speculation, and heterogeneous
interpretation of the information (Garfinkel and Sokobin [2006]). We use the method
suggested by Biais, Hillion and Spatt [1999] to estimate the noisiness of stock return and
efficiency of price discovery after earnings announcements. As suggested in Barclay and
Hendershott [2003], the slope coefficient of the regression can be interpreted as a signal
to noise ratio. Since we focus on the earnings announcement events only and the
announcement times vary from one company to another, we are not able to segment the
regression into intervals to measure price efficiency as in their paper. Instead, we regress
the announcement-to-close return on the return from announcement-to-open since our
primary event of interest starts at the earnings announcement time. An earnings
announcement occurs on day t=0, which begins with the first trade or quote following the
most recent market close prior to the announcement and ends with the next market
closing price after the announcement. To capture the effect from the announcement, we
use the last trade price before the announcement to the opening and close price of the
RTH. Specifically, for BMO, the returns are calculated from the last trading price before
the announcement to the opening price (rao), and to the close price (rac) of the same day.
For AMC, the returns are calculated from the last trading price before the announcement
to the opening price (rao), and to the close price (rac) of the next day.
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rac

= α + βrao+εi

(8)

Since our focus is the immediate reaction of return after the announcement, we
treat each earnings announcement event as one observation. We estimate the regression
for overall sample and separately for BMO and AMC sample. Because the BMO
announcement is closer to the RTH, traders have less time to assimilate earnings
information compared to the AMC announcements when traders have overnight. In
addition, BMO announcements may also occur concurrently on days with economic
news. Therefore, it is of interest to investigate whether the efficiency of returns differs for
BMO and AMC periods.
Table 9 presents the results of price efficiency of sample. In general, the
coefficient is close to one in all cases. The beta coefficient is 0.99 for the full sample. In
Table 9, Panels B and C, the BMO subsample has a beta coefficient of 0.978 while the
coefficient of AMC is 1.017. None of the alpha coefficients are significantly different
from zero. Thus, the price reactions on the earnings announcements are quite efficient.
Barclay and Hendershott [2003] suggest that there seem to be more noise for BMO than
AMC after the announcement is made. This happens because market has less time to
interpret earnings information and investors may have divergence opinions.
Since most of the trades in reaction to earnings news in AMC occur immediately
following the announcements (often within half an hour of the close of the market), we
also conduct additional tests for the AMC sub-sample to study more closely the price
efficiency for the period from the first trade after the announcement to 18:30. We regress
the announcement-to-close return (rac) on the return from announcement to 18:30. The
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results (not reported for brevity) are qualitatively similar. The beta coefficient is at 1.076
and is significantly at the 1% level, indicating a slight overreaction in the AMC session.

TABLE 9
The Efficiency of Return
An earnings announcement occurs on day t=0, which begins with the first trade or quote
following the most recent market close prior to the announcement and ends with the next
market closing price after the announcement. For announcements that occur during the
BMO, the announcement-to-close return is regressed on the return from the
announcement-to-open. For announcements that occur during AMC, the return from
announcement-to-close of day t=0 is regressed on return from the announcement to the
following open.
rac

= α + βrao+εi

(8)

These simple OLS regressions are used to measure the efficiency of price as suggested by
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt [1999]. One earnings announcement is treated as a single
observation. The dependent variable is rac and the independent variable is rao. The sample
consists of 582 stocks included in the S&P500 during the years 2004-2008. The earnings
announcement days and times are from I/B/E/S. We match the stocks symbols and
earnings announcement days from I/B/E/S with Compustat and Bloomberg to ensure data
integrity. Panel A shows the regression result from the full sample. Panel B and C report
the results separately for BMO and AMC. The t-statistics are reported in italic.
Coefficient Estimates

t-statistics

-0.001
0.999

-1.431
87. 24***

Panel B: The BMO sub-sample
α
β

-0.001
0.978

-1.179
60.76***

Panel C: The AMC sub-sample
α
β

0.000
1.017

-0.283
60.522***

Panel A: The full sample
α
β

***

Significant at the 0.01 level
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6. Robustness Test on the Impact of Macroeconomics Announcements
BMO earnings announcements may sometime coincide with the scheduled
macroeconomic announcement such as unemployment, GDP or CPI. Adams, McQueen
and Wood [1999] find a significant impact of inflation on large cap stock prices. Poitras
[2004], however, finds that the announcement variables contribute very little to daily
price changes and have weak explanatory power.
To investigate whether the macroeconomic announcements affect the price
change and price discovery related to the earnings announcements of the firms, we run
the regression analysis by adding the macroeconomic event as an additional dummy
variable. We collect a set of macroeconomic announcements from the website during our
study period. 10 To be consistent with prior studies, the macroeconomic variables we use
are GDP, CPI, PPI and unemployment data. The GDP data is usually released on the last
Friday of January, April, July and October for the previous quarter. Each quarter's data
are revised in each of the following two months after the initial release. The
unemployment data is usually released on the first Friday of the month. The CPI and PPI
are usually released on the 11th and 13th business day of the month, respectively. All news
is scheduled to be released at 8:30 A.M. (EST). The maximum possible number of each
event is 60 distinct days. 11 We match each of the macroeconomic announcements with
our S&P500 sample for BMO announcements. We find that 227, 56, 150 and 157
earnings announcements in our sample occur on the same day as the release days of GDP,

10

www.econoday.com

11

GDP are released on quarterly basis. With the initial release plus two revisions for each quarter,
there are 12 event dates for each year. Employment and inflation data are released on monthly basis. Thus,
for our 5 year sample period, we have 60 event days for all the variables considered.
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unemployment, CPI and PPI, respectively. We set the dummy variable ECON equals 1 if
one of these variables coincides with BMO announcement and 0 for no macroeconomic
announcement or AMC announcements. We analyze the potential effect of
macroeconomic events on both WPCs, price discovery from private information, and
price efficiency. For brevity, we only present the results for the price discovery with the
dummy ECON added in Table 10.
Price discovery = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size +
β5AHspread + β6AMC + β7NYSE + β8ECON + ε

(9)

The results show that macroeconomic announcement in the morning does not
materially change our findings. The dummy variable ECON is not statistically different
from zero. The results on the WPCs and price efficiency are qualitatively similar.
Therefore, our findings of AHT having significant impact on price discovery and price
contribution subsequent to earnings releases are robust.
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TABLE 10
Robustness Test on Concurrent Macroeconomic Announcements
We perform a robustness test on the determinants of price discovery in the regression
framework by adding the ECON dummy variables.
Price discovery = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size +
β5AHspread + β6AMC + β7NYSE + β8ECON + ε

(9)

The variables are the same as in regression (7) with an additional dummy variable
ECON, where ECON equals 1 if GDP, unemployment, CPI or PPI data is released on the
same day as the earnings releases in the BMO period, and 0 if there is no macroeconomic
announcement. The t-statistics of the coefficients are reported in italic.
Independent Variables
Intercept
Analysts
Surprise
Volume
Firm_Size

1
-0.1318
-1.33
0.0013
1.47
-0.0965
-0.75
0.0412
4.55***
-0.0215
-2.75***

AHspread
AMC
NYSE
ECON

0.0623
4.35***
-0.0521
-4.61***
-0.0104
-0.25

***

Significant at the 0.01 level
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2
-0.0535
-0.52
0.0012
1.36
-0.0772
-0.60
0.0390
4.31***
-0.0231
-2.97***
-0.0114
-3.13***
0.0669
4.66***
-0.0475
-4.18***
-0.0119
-0.29

7. Concluding Remarks
After-hours trading (AHT) has gained interest from traders, researchers, and
regulators in recent years. Even though trading volume is relatively low compared to the
regular hours trading (RTH), AHT plays a significant role for the market to act upon
corporate announcements which are concentrated during the before market open (BMO)
or after market close (AMC) periods. We use a sample of stocks included in the S&P500
for the years 2004-2008, in which 95% of earnings announcements released either during
BMO or AMC. Our study focuses on price reactions, price discovery and efficiency in
AHT immediately following earnings announcements. Contrary to the thin trading often
documented for AHT, we find that overall trading activity is heightened greatly on the
earnings announcements days. Even though illiquidity remains an issue for AHT
compared to RTH, we find higher level of liquidity on the event days. Investors act
swiftly following the earnings announcements as we observe immediate price reactions in
AHT. The trades during BMO and AMC periods contribute to 36% and 60% of price
changes, respectively. Price discovery are also much higher for AHT following the event
despite relatively low volume. As a result of AHT trading, the short term price changes
after the announcements to the market open reflect the earnings news efficiently.
Our study clearly demonstrates the importance of AHT on days when corporate
earnings are released outside of RTH. Given the current level of AHT volume, informed
traders who have access to AHT are able to trade ahead of the majority of investors. Our
findings also have implications for studies of PEAD as event studies around earnings
announcements should not only take account the timing of the AHT announcements
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(Berkman and Truong [2009]), but also the immediate market responses to the
announcements.
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ESSAY 2
THE IMPACT OF LOW COST AIRLINE ENTRY ON COMPETITION,
NETWORK EXPANSION AND STOCK VALUATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION
Major economic trends, including globalization and transition to a knowledgebased economy, have increased international and intra-national travel. As the dominant
long distance passenger mode in the U.S., airlines have encountered a difficult period
since 9/11 with decreases in passenger boarding in 2007. Following airline deregulation
in 1978, the successful emergence of low cost carriers (LCCs) is one of the most
important structural and financial developments in the airline industry. The concept
originated in the U.S. and later spread to other parts of the world. What made the market
highly susceptible to LCC entries were its oligopoly structure, entry barriers and high
fixed costs.(Moore, Rubin, & Joy [2007]) By 2006, LCCs served one third (32.9%) of all
domestic origin and destination passengers, and even not using them, about three-fourths
of domestic passengers had access to LCC service (Daraban [2007]). Southwest Airlines,
the pioneer of the low cost airline business model was the second largest U.S. carrier in
terms of both passengers and market share in 2004-2006.
We posit two opposing effects of LCC entry on legacy airline profitability and
stock prices. The airline industry represents a contestable oligopoly, where the major
oligopoly participants may refrain from price maximization. Entry of low cost rivals with
a more efficient cost structure and a different business strategy can significantly alter the
competitive positioning of the legacy airlines. Thus, the first effect of increased
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competition points to a negative pressure on legacy airline margins. However, a positive
network expansion effect of LCC entry is created through economies of scope and
increased industry-wide connectivity. The spillover effect of expanded network points to
increased revenues. Thus, the entry of low cost carriers into the airport markets of
established airlines would be expected to impact the financial performance of the legacy
airlines. We posit that the trade-off between competitive and spillover effects eventually
determines the net impact on legacy airline stock prices. The objective of this paper is to
explore the impact of LCC entry into a large airport on the direction and the magnitude of
stock price changes of the six legacy airlines. This analysis extends previous research to
present an event study of the dynamic stock market responses of the legacy, but
contestable, oligopoly airlines to LCC entry into the hub or major market airports of the
legacy airlines. The findings will improve understanding of the financial impact of the
LCCs on stock values in the U.S. airline industry and may also inform policies and
regulation of the airline industry in the U.S. Although we focus on the airline industry,
the issues we have analyzed also have bearings in other network industries such as Bank
branch versus ATMs, real estate MLS, telephone services and internet services, computer
hardware and software among others.
We organize the rest of the paper into several sections focusing on the airline
industry structure, literature review, discussion of competition versus network expansion
or economies of scope, data and methodology, empirical results, and conclusions.
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II. THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The 1971 entry of Southwest Airlines into Love-Field Airport of Dallas is
often considered the initial effect of deregulation in the passenger airline industry.
Incorporated in 1967, Southwest was facing legal action from the incumbent airlines
when it announced its intention to start carrying passengers. Finally in late 1970, the
United States Supreme Court upheld Southwest’s right to fly (Texas State Historical
Association [2008]). After that, the industry pushed towards deregulation which came in
1978 with the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act. Market forces led to the entry of
many new airlines leading to a significant network expansion. Increased passenger traffic
opened new business opportunities for all players in the industry. However, new entrants
were confronted with an aggressive pricing strategy by the legacy carriers. Only a few
start-up airlines were able to survive that era and position themselves in the market. At
the end of the 20th century, new airlines (e.g. Frontier Airlines in 1994, JetBlue Airways
in 1999) entered the market and were able to gain market shares due to their different
business model based on a lower cost structure. Transport Research Board [1999]
analyzed the routes that Southwest entered between 1990 and 1998 and found that on
average passenger trips increased 174 percent. Other new carriers emulated the strategy
that Southwest Airlines, and America West Airlines started in 1983 by offering even
lower airfares. Although both business and leisure passengers benefited substantially
from airline deregulation and subsequent reduced fares, the network airlines found
themselves in a situation of competitive and financial difficulty. Since the late 1990s, the
legacy carriers have been in a crisis mode, American Airlines being the only carrier of the
big six legacy airlines that has not filed for bankruptcy (Bailey [2006]).
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Comparing their business models and the unique structure of the airline industry,
airlines can be divided into three main categories: legacy, low cost, and regional carriers.
In the U.S., the term “legacy carriers” refers to the traditional airlines or “The Big Six”
including: American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines,
United Airlines, and US Airways 1. While most regional airlines, as the name suggests,
focus on regional markets or serve as a feeder for a legacy carrier, most LCCs, as well as
all the legacy airlines, serve cities across the United States. This study focuses on the
impact of LCCs on the legacy airlines, with focus on the stock valuation effect as well as
competitive and network expansion impacts of LCC entry into large airports served by
the legacy carriers.
Legacy carriers are characterized by a hub-and-spoke system which has become
the centrepiece of their business model. Delta Airlines developed the system in 1955 and
created a hub at Hartsfield-Jackson Airport in Atlanta, GA. After the deregulation of the
airline industry in 1978, American Airlines was given the lowest chance of survival due
to its high cost structure (Daraban [2007]). However, the company implemented a new
strategy which soon became a symbol of the legacy airlines. Starting with a hub in
Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX, American Airlines concentrated departures and arrivals at certain
airports in order to increase the probability of connecting outbound flights with inbound
flights. In contrast to the previous model of point-to-point transit, passengers fly from
their departure city along a spoke to a hub and board a flight on another, often major or
longer, spoke to their destination. Airlines generally use large aircraft to serve these
trunk-lines between hubs, and smaller airplanes for the connections of a hub to another

1

The merger of Delta and Northwest Airlines in 2008 occurred subsequent to the period of this
analysis, so that the six legacy carriers analyzed remained through 2007.
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city along a spoke. The simple model of a hub and spoke network is shown in Figure 1
Panel A. The effects of competition and network expansion deriving from LCC entry are
shown in Panel B discussed below.
Using the hub-and-spoke model, the legacy airlines try to achieve maximum
connectivity while reducing less profitable routes, leaving the smaller routes to the
regional carriers and LCCs. The combination of several nodes on one flight route creates
cost efficiencies, because fewer flights are needed to connect the same number of cities.
The hub and spoke model has been preferred by the legacy airlines as an airport system
since it generates higher flight frequency and traffic between hubs and reduces passenger
inconvenience from extra travel time (Brueckner [2004]). One essential characteristic of
the hub-and-spoke system is that operating costs are largely fixed and independent of the
number of passengers transported, so that, if there is a vacant seat, transportation of a
marginal passenger has close to zero cost. Because of the lower costs and the extensive
coverage of regional markets, a hub-and-spoke network represents a considerable, but
penetrable, barrier of entry for new airlines (Rubin and Joy [2005]). Other characteristics
of the legacy airline business model are the existence of different classes on an airplane,
frequent flyer programs, airport lounges, and strategic alliances with other airlines,
including both regional (e.g. SkyTeam, Star Alliance) and legacy (e.g. NWA with KLM
and Delta and Continental) carriers.
A low cost carrier or low cost airline (also known as a no-frills or discount carrier)
is an airline that offers generally low fares and eliminates many passenger services
historically found in the legacy airlines. As of 2007, there are more than 20 low cost
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Panel A. Hub-and-spoke model

Legacy airlines route
LCC competition
LCC network expansion
Hub city

Spoke city

LCC entry

Panel B. Competition and network expansion

Figure 1
The diagram depicts hub-and-spoke model
The model used by legacy airlines to achieve maximum connectivity between highly
congested cities (hubs) and less congested cities (spokes).
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airlines operating in the U.S. with some of these subsidiaries of the legacy airlines. In this
paper, we include only the six largest LCCs that operate solely as low cost airlines; these
six LCCs comprise 21.3% of the total 769.4 million domestic and international
passengers flying in the U.S. in 2007 (BTS [2008]). Although some LCCs, like Frontier
Airlines, also operate under a hub-and-spoke model, their business model is distinct from
that of the established airlines.
LCC’s lower operating cost structure is achieved by three different types of
savings: distribution, product design, and overhead savings (Magill [2004]). First,
distribution savings are achieved because flights can only be booked on-line instead of
through travel agencies. Thus, the LCC airlines operate without computer reservation
system fees or other travel agency commission fees, and they generally do not have
frequent flyer programs. Second, product design savings are realized with different
aircraft design. The LCCs not only operate airplanes with only one class, they also try to
increase the number of seats in an aircraft by reducing legroom. Airlines that operate with
a low cost structure are often known as no-frills airlines, referring to the non-availability
of free food, beverages, and newspapers, as well as reduced flight service. More recently,
the legacy airlines have also moved in the same direction to reduce costs wherever
possible. The business model of typical low cost airline is usually based on a single type
of airplane providing a substantial cost advantage from reduced training and maintenance
cost, fast turnaround time allowing maximized aircraft utilization, and minimal diversity
of equipment. Low cost airlines are less likely to be unionized and also practice a strategy
of aggressive fuel hedging (Daraban [2007]). Finally, some LCCs reduce operational
overhead by serving secondary urban airports, thereby avoiding high airport charges. All
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these factors make possible a reduced cost per available seat kilometre ($/ASK) of up to
50% (Magill [2004]).
Due to these substantial cost differences, LCCs are able to offer lower air fares
and to penetrate markets of established airlines, despite the high barriers of entry in the
airline industry. Entry barriers result not only from the hub-and-spoke system, but also
from scarce landing slots at airports, as well as federal restrictions against foreign
ownership of U.S. airlines that preclude the possibility of international investment. But
the main barrier to entry is the existing oligopoly market structure of the airline industry,
because a limited number of firms can set or change prices in the industry. Actions taken
by any firm in an oligopoly are quickly noticed by its competitors and subject to swift
reactions. This results in interdependence among the oligopoly companies because each
airline knows that its market power is contestable or vulnerable to entry or other rival
reactions (Rubin and Joy [2005]).
Oligopoly market power is usually measured by the industry concentration ratio,
which relates the market share of the largest firms in the industry to the size of the entire
market. As depicted in Figure 3, from February 2007 to January 2008, the market share
of the so-called Big Six was almost 60% of all Revenue Passenger Miles. Southwest
added another 12 % market share, leaving less than 30% to the remaining smaller
airlines.
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Figure 2
Comparison of cost structures between network legacy airlines and low cost carriers
Source: Magill, D. [2004], “Overview of the Low Cost Carrier Market Worldwide”, 3rd
Annual MIT Airline Industry – Washington DC Conference
Note: ASK=available seat kilometer; CRS=computer reservation system; FFP=frequent
flyer programs
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American
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11%
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Figure 3
Market shares of airline industry by revenue passenger miles
Market shares of the six legacy airlines, Southwest Airline and others from February
2007 to January 2008.
Source: Website of Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Research and Innovative
Technology Administration. http://www.transtats.bts.gov
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW
Substantial research on the entry of LCCs deals with the emergence and
success of Southwest Airlines, the first and most successful low cost airline in the U.S.
Bogulaski, Ito and Lee [2004] try to determine and quantify the factors and market
characteristics that impact Southwest’s entry decision. They search routes that are most
likely to be entered and predict the implications on the legacy airlines, concluding that
future entries of Southwest airlines are expected to increasingly affect the revenues of
established carriers. Flouris and Walker [2005] examine the stock and accounting
performance of three airlines (Southwest, Continental, and Northwest) in the
aftermath of 9/11, finding dramatic changes in the airline industry and significant
implications for the economic gains and future of most airlines. Focusing on the stock
market’s perception of the viability of low-cost versus full-service business models
following 9/11, they concluded that, in the eyes of investors, Southwest’s business
model provides significantly more financial and operational flexibility than fullservice airlines. The LCC business model has also been introduced in Europe and Latin
America. Alderighi, Cento, Nijkamp and Pretveld. [2004] investigated the response of
full service carriers or legacy airlines to the entry of LCCs into European markets.
They find that when LCCs enter a market, the legacy airlines react by reducing
their airfares with a larger impact on business class than leisure class fares. Oliveira
[2008] studied the route choice model of Gol Airline’s entry in Brazil, as the first LCC
airline in Brazil and Latin America. Gol initially followed a strategy similar to that of
Southwest Airline by focusing on short-haul and high density routes. It succeeded in
penetrating the market and now has 13 percent market share and is the only profitable
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airline in that market. Beyond the impact of competition on pricing, Mazzeo [2003]
studied the effect of competition on service quality, finding that flight delays are more
prominent and longer on routes where airlines face less competition.
Other research addresses the impact of LCC entry on airfares. Several studies
(Windle and Dresner [1995], Bennet and Craun [1993] and Morrison and Winston
[1995]) find that LCC entry into the markets of established airlines significantly reduces
ticket prices. More recently, Ito and Lee [2003] analyze the pricing behaviour of the
legacy airlines that are impacted by LCC entry. They find that the incumbent response to
an LCC entry is rarely aggressive, i.e. the incumbents adjust their airfares by lowering
them but rarely try to undercut the LCC fares in order to squeeze the entrants out of the
market. Dresner et al. [1996] find that airfares on a competitive route are lowered when
an LCC enters a certain city pair. This approach takes into account consumers’
willingness to drive to a nearby airport (e.g. Oakland, CA vs. San Francisco, CA). Similar
behaviour is observed by WinburSmith Associates (WSA) [2007] in the Pittsburgh
region. The study claims “in 2000, more than 193,600 residents of western Pennsylvania
drove to Cleveland, Columbus and Akron, to take advantage of the competitive pricing
offered by LCC at nearby airports.” In addition to price adjustments in the case of an
actual entry on a route, Goolsbee and Syverson [2005] find that incumbents adjust their
fares even when the route is only threatened by LCC entry. In their study, a route is
perceived as threatened when Southwest starts operating on both endpoints of the route
but not the route itself. A recent study by Daraban [2007] on the impact of LCCs on
airfares addresses several limitations of previous studies. He focuses on the arbitrage
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actions of travellers who select among alternative routes and, thus, generate a correlation
of airfares on adjacent routes.
While the impact of LCCs on airfares and airline markets in general has been
researched, the competitive effects of LCCs are not limited to their air routes and fares,
but may also impact the stock valuation of legacy carriers when LCCs enter their hub or
major markets. For example, Whinston and Collins [1992] conducted an event study
analysis that is most similar to the approach used in this paper. They cover two years of
entry announcements into airport-pairs by People Express (an LCC that operated in the
U.S. from 1981 to 1987) to shed light on airline competitive structure and examine the
stock price reactions of incumbent airlines to People Express entry announcements into
various routes. We expand this body of research in several ways. First, we expand their
two-year coverage of one LCC to look at the entry of six dominant LCCs during 30 years
into 31 of the largest and hub airports of the six legacy carriers. We broaden the analysis
of the effect of LCC announcements beyond the individual entry routes to the
comprehensive strategies of airlines and their impact on overall stock valuations.
Moreover, we examine the spillover effects of LCC entry in addition to the competitive
effects. The extended time period, including such events as 9/11 and the shift from
largely travel agent to on-line marketing and ticketing, etc., could potentially change the
way LCC entry affects legacy airlines in recent times relative to the period studied by
Whinston and Collins [1992].
Whereas focusing on individual LCC routes would be appropriate to understand
airfare pricing issues, our research design pertains to the understanding of stock values.
Stock returns are impacted by multiple considerations, and we note that a single LCC
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entry may impact multiple routes of multiple airlines on the same date. Moreover, the
individual route decisions are often part of a large strategic corporate decision of airport
entry keeping in mind potential competition and maximization of overall potential
consumer base.
Our paper extends previous work by using both the dates of announcements and
the actual entry dates into airports to determine whether LCC entry has a significant
effect on competition and network expansion, as well as stock prices, of the established
airlines in the 21st century. To analyze the impact of the announcement and actual entry
of the six largest low cost carriers on the six legacy airlines, we apply both standard event
study methodology and regression analysis to unique databases derived from original
data searches.
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Panel B. Number of LCC entries by year they began operations: 1970-2007
Figure 4
Number of announcements of low cost carrier entry by year
The low cost carriers included in the study are AirTran, ATA, Frontier, JetBlue,
Southwest, and Spirit. The study includes events from the first Southwest Airline
announcement in 1970 until 2007. There were no subsequent new entrants into the
industry until the 1990s and there are some years with no LCC announcements or entries.
Panel A depicts the number of announcements from 6 LCCs, 1970-2007. Panel B
presents the number of LCC entries 1971-2007.
Sources: Websites of Airlines and Air Transport Association
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IV. COMPETITION VS. NETWORK EXPANSION AND
ECONOMIES OF SCOPE
We posit that competition and network expansion are two important effects of
LCC entry. Economides and Salop [1992] provide a theoretical model and discussion of
the trade-off between competitive and complementary effects in the context of network
market structure. LCC entry may be a catalyst for price wars among airlines, as the
incumbent legacy airlines face increased price competition when LCCs enter the airports
they serve. In contrast, the complementarities emerge from new LCC routes and
additional LCC passengers who previously did not have flight options from their
respective cities.
Hurdle et al. [1989] show that the number of potential entrants affects market
concentration measured by fares. For example, Wilbur Smith Associates (WSA) [2007]
finds that airfares of US Airways, which dominated the Pittsburgh region, drop
dramatically with the expansion of AirTran in this airport. Air fares in Pittsburgh
declined 27% while average airfare in the U.S. increased about 7% (Wilbur Smith
Associates [2007]). Most studies conclude unanimously that LCC entry adversely affects
the fares charged by the legacy airlines, and these price-effects point to potentially lower
profits and stock prices for legacy airlines. In our experimental design, observation of
negative abnormal stock returns for legacy airlines indicates that the competition effect
dominates.
LCC entry has both costs and benefits, as the incumbent airlines may also enjoy
benefits from increased traffic connectivity when an LCC starts serving new routes. We
show a simple model of LCC entry and its effects on competition and network expansion
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in Figure 1 Panel B. LCC entry into a market creates increased competition among
incumbent airlines if they fly the same routes. When an LCC launches routes that were
not operated previously by the existing airlines, it creates a network expansion effect in
the market. WSA [2007] estimates an increase of more than 110,000 passengers visiting a
region served by an LCC and new demand of more than 76,000 passengers from those
who otherwise would not have travelled by plane. A similar study by Chmura Economics
& Analytics [2006] reports the entry of two LCCs, AirTran in June 2005 and JetBlue in
March 2006, into Richmond International Airport (RIC). The study shows that with these
LCC entries, for the year 2006, the number of passengers in RIC increased by 400,000
passengers, a dramatic change from previous years, and average fares were reduced
across airlines. Whinston and Collins [1992] find that fares of incumbents fell on routes
both to the same city-pair and to other airports with LCC introduction.
However, the incumbents also benefit from a network expansion effect which
refers to the benefit that a participant in a network derives from others. The utility that a
user derives from consuming their products or services increases with the expansion of
the network. Katz and Shapiro [1992] in their theoretical model of network externalities,
competition and compatibility point out that “the central feature of the market that
determines the scope of the relevant network is whether the products of different firms
may be used together”. Their model suggests that even though competing firms will try to
differentiate their services and dominate the market, the firms may also have an incentive
to choose to create compatible product or services. The latter strategy, however, leads to
an increase in size of the market. As a result, consumers benefit from a larger network. In
the airline industry, traditional carries can benefit by connecting passengers from un-

81

served origins to the served destinations, and vice versa, if the LCC introduces new
routes that are not served currently by the airline. Since the routes from origin and
destination cities of LCCs are more limited, and the legacy airlines have more
comprehensive routes than LCC airlines, the network benefit of LCC entry to the
traditional airlines can outweigh the competitive losses. Hallowell [2000] proposes that
economies of scope in passenger airline cargo benefit overall operations, as long as the
airlines earn marginal revenues higher than marginal costs on cargo, because their
existing assets (aircraft) are utilized more efficiently.
A study by the European Parliament [2007) on the growth of low-cost airlines in
European markets concludes that LCC development benefits the relevant
macroeconomies. It brings new traffic demand for existing and newly developed airports
and also creates additional traffic flows on newly created routes that were not previously
served by legacy airlines. It creates a significant impact on regional economies since
LCCs tend to choose regional airports to complement their business model. As a result,
some little known or underdeveloped regions become more visible when promoted by
LCC advertisement so that both regional and legacy airports mutually benefit from
enhanced economic development.
In our regression analyses, we focus on the two key variables of competition and
network expansion and control for several other factors that may affect stock prices. We
hypothesize that the level of competition should have a negative effect on the returns of
legacy airlines while network expansion should have a positive effect, so our two
hypotheses are:
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H1: An increase in airline industry competition due to LCC entry is negatively
associated with returns of the legacy airlines.
H2: An increase in airline network expansion due to LCC entry is positively
associated with returns of the legacy airlines.
We test these two hypotheses with both announcement and entry dates. The drift
after announcements and additional effects on implementation are not a completely rare
phenomenon. The entry announcements do not contain information about airfare pricing,
plane sizes, and other details which are important determinants of overall profitability.
We also note that these findings are consistent with the broad conclusion that spillover
effects (known fully only after implementation) of LCC entry outweigh competitive
impacts (already known upon announcement).

V. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
V(i). Data.
To conduct this study, data was collected and datasets developed for the following: the
established carriers and the low cost carriers, major and hub airports, LCC announcement
and entry dates for 1971 through 2007, and the relevant daily stock prices of the legacy
airlines during this period. Because manual collection of LCC announcement and entry
dates constituted an extensive and time-consuming process, we limit the number of events by
focusing on the 30 largest U.S. airports and four additional hub airports of the six major
carriers. We obtain data from several sources. First, the Bureau of Transportation and

Statistics, Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) provides a long
history of very comprehensive data on air traffic since 1990. Table 1 Panel A presents
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basic data for the six legacy airlines whose stock prices are analyzed, including:
American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, United
Airlines, and US Airways. The seventh network carrier, Alaska Airlines, is more limited
in scope and is not generally considered among the legacy airlines and is not included in
this study.

TABLE 1
PASSENGERS ENPLANED AND OPERATING REVENUES FOR LEGACY AIRLINES AND LOW
COST CARRIERS
Passengers
Established Enplaned in 2006
(Thousands)a

Operating Revenues in
2006 (Millions)b

Panel A. Legacy Airlines
American
Airlines
Continental
Airlines
Delta Airlines
Northwest
Airlines
United Airlines
US Airways

22,493
1934

98,142

1934
1929

46,738
72,524

1926
1926
1939

54,837
69,265
57,659

13,010
17,339
12,555
19,334
11,845

Panel B. Low Cost Carriers
AirTran Airways
1,893
/ ValuJet Airlines
1993
20,033
752
ATA Airlines
1973
2,624
2,363
JetBlue Airways
1999
18,507
1,131
Frontier Airlines
1994
8,895
Southwest
9,086
Airlines
1967c
96,276
540
Spirit Airlines
1980
4,477
Sources: Websites of Airlines, Air Transport Association, 2006 ATA Annual Report,
www.airlines.org.
a
Scheduled Services only,
b
All Services (including charter service).
c
Southwest was incorporated in 1967, but started flying in 1971.
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While the established airlines are widely recognized, the selection process for the
low cost carriers whose entries were to be examined was more complicated, mainly
because no definitive list of the largest LCCs by an official source was found. Thus, to
determine the optimum number of LCCs for analysis, the first approach was an Air
Transport Association [2007] list that includes every airline in the United States, from
which we eliminated the smaller regional and charter airlines, as well as all cargo
carriers. The issue of defining a threshold for LCC inclusion remained, as study criteria
could have been market shares or passengers. We first excluded airlines that had
previously been large LCCs but have gone out of business. Ultimately, financial data
reports by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics proved helpful because they list
financial figures of a 21-carrier group that includes the seven largest network, regional,
and low cost airlines (U.S. Department of Transportation [2007]). The selected group of
six LCCs (AirTran Airways, ATA Airlines, Frontier Airlines, JetBlue Airways,
Southwest Airlines, and Spirit Airlines) described in Table 1 Panel B provides the
dominant LCCs that fit the research criteria.
Research on the selected LCCs raised further issues related to the carriers. First,
there was the merger of America West Airlines with US Airways in 2005. America West
was started in 1983 and became the second largest LCC in the U.S, but its merger with
US Airways, completed in late 2007, resulted in a change of business strategy for US
Airways. Although the airline now considers itself a low cost carrier, the recent change in
its business strategy was completed after the last entry date of this study sample (US
Airways Annual Report [2006]), and as such, in this research, US Airways is included as
a legacy network airline. However, due to the merger with US Airways, no data was
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available on America West’s destinations and announcement or entry dates into new
airports. Thus, America West Airlines had to be eliminated from this analysis, leaving
only six LCCs in the sample.
Additional LCC issues concerned AirTran and ATA airlines. First, AirTran
Airways, a small airline based in Orlando, FL, was bought by ValuJet in 1997. Following
a serious ValuJet airplane crash near Miami, FL and consequent FAA investigation, the
airline’s reputation declined. Due to the crash ValuJet was forced to reduce its operations,
and it subsequently bought AirTran and adopted the AirTran name (Huettel [2006]).
Second, in 2004, ATA Airlines filed for bankruptcy and substantially reduced its
operations, withdrawing from numerous airports and leaving a gap that a code-share
agreement with Southwest Airlines was supposed to fill. A code-share agreement is an
accord between two airlines that allows customers of one airline to take connecting
flights of the other without booking two different flights. Ticketing and airline codes are
provided by either of the two airlines. After a period of reorganization, ATA again filed
for bankruptcy on April 2, 2008, discontinuing all operations and cancelling all flights. In
addition, Spirit Airlines is an LCC that operates from Florida and mainly serves
Caribbean destinations.
Further data determination concerns the selection of the airports for analysis. The
sample selected needed to include all the hubs of the established carriers, in addition to
major non-hub airports out of the total of 566 functioning U.S. airports (FAA [2006]).
Table 2 shows the 30 largest airports by total number of passengers as of 2006, plus three
additional hub airports (Cleveland, St. Louis, and Memphis) that are included in order to
encompass all the hubs of the six legacy carriers. Total passengers are measured as all
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arriving and departing passengers, with direct transit passengers counted only once. The
ranking was taken from the Airports Council International – North America, whose
members account for more than 95% of domestic passenger traffic in North America 2.
Honolulu Airport (HNL) and Cincinnati (CVG) entries are excluded from our test
because exact announcement dates can not be obtained. Toronto-Pearson Airport (YYZ),
one of the largest airports in North America, is not included in this study, which focuses
only on U.S. airports. Therefore, our final sample contains announcements and entries of
LCCs in thirty one airports.
Announcement and entry dates for each of the six largest LCCs into these airports
were individually retrieved from the airlines’ websites, press releases, and the Lexis
Nexis database for1971 to 2007. There are a total of 110 announcement dates and 109
entry dates in our sample. In some cases, announcement dates are missing or not
reported, so we note that not all entries have announcement dates. Also the entry or
announcement of each of the LCC carriers into any one of the 31 airports is counted as a
single event. Since our study focuses on understanding stock valuation changes, we avoid
the econometric problems of clustered route analysis by counting the LCC entry decision
into an airport as a single strategic decision. Whereas focusing on individual LCC routes
would be appropriate to understand airfare pricing issues, our research design focuses on
the understanding of stock values. We believe this is a conservative approach to assess
the impact of entries on stock returns. The statistical significance of our results would be
higher if the number of observations was based on the number of routes instead of the

2

Toronto-Pearson Airport (YYZ) is one of the largest airports in North America but was not
included in this study, which focuses only on U.S. airports.
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TABLE 2
THIRTY LARGEST AIRPORTS PLUS ADDITIONAL HUB AIRPORTS BY TOTAL PASSENGERS
Number of LCC
Total Passengers
entries from 1971Rank
Airport
in 2006
2007
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
84,846,639
4
1
(ATL)
2
Chicago O'Hare (ORD)
77,028,134
2
3
Los Angeles (LAX)
61,041,066
3
4
Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW)
60,226,138
4
5
Denver (DEN)
47,325,016
5
6
Las Vegas (LAS)
46,193,329
7
7
JFK-New York (JFK)
43,762,282
1
8
Houston (IAH)
42,550,432
6
9
Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX)
41,436,737
4
10
Newark (EWR)
36,724,167
3
11
Detroit (DTW)
35,972,673
4
12
Minneapolis/St. Paul (MSP)
35,612,133
3
13
Orlando (MCO)
34,640,451
4
14
San Francisco (SFO)
33,574,807
6
15
Miami (MIA)
32,533,974
2
16
Philadelphia (PHL)
31,768,272
3
17
Toronto Pearson (YYZ)
30,972,577
18
Seattle-Tacoma (SEA)
29,693,949
5
19
Charlotte (CLT)
29,693,949
2
20
Boston Logan (BOS)
27,725,443
5
21
LaGuardia-New York (LGA)
26,571,146
5
22
Dulles-Washington DC (IAD)
22,813,067
4
23
Salt Lake City (SLC)
21,557,656
3
Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood
21,369,787
4
24
(FLL)
25
Baltimore/Washington (BWI)
21,184,208
3
26
Honolulu (HNL)
20,067,871
27
Tampa (TPA)
18,867,541
4
28
Chicago Midway (MDW)
18,680,663
4
29
Reagan-Washington (DCA)
18,545,557
5
30
San Diego (SAN)
17,481,942
5
Additional Hub airports:
Cincinnati (CVG)
16,244,962
St. Louis (STL)
15,205,944
5
Cleveland (CLE)
11,321,050
1
Memphis (MEM)
11,176,460
2
Sum: 118
Sources: Airports Council International – North America, Websites of Airlines
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number of airport entries. We note that stock returns are impacted by multiple
considerations, and a single LCC entry may impact routes of multiple airlines on the
same date.
We also find that there are more than 40 distinct announcements and entries for
the time period between the crisis caused by the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001
and 2007. The major airports are in key U.S. industrial cities, all being served by the
established carriers.
Further, due to the scarcity of landing slots or gates at these critical airports, the
legacy airlines rarely give up slots once they have acquired them, and as a result, the
presence of the long-term legacy airlines is assumed in the major U.S. airports prior to
more recent LCC entry. We are able to infer the existence of each airline on all 31
airports from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) database from the BTS
website 3. The DB1B data contains all low cost carrier entry and announcement dates
from 1993 to 2007. This period represents 93% of announcement dates with the
remaining 7% occurring during 1970 to 1992. We explicitly verified the presence of all
legacy airlines in all airports analyzed from 1993 onwards.
The stock prices of the legacy airlines were retrieved from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, in order to analyze the impact of LCC
announcements and entries on the stock prices of the network legacy airlines. While the
maximum potential sample is 660 announcement dates and 654 entry dates, due to
mergers and bankruptcies, the stock prices of some airlines are not available during
3

The Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) is a 10% sample of airline tickets from
reporting carriers. Data includes origin, destination and other itinerary details of passengers transported.
The existence of an airline in a particular airport can be inferred from non-zero and non-missing number of
passengers in origin/destination airport.
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certain periods of time. This reduced the sample data to a total of 566 LCC
announcement dates and 511 LCC entry dates, as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3
NUMBER OF LOW COST CARRIER ANNOUNCEMENT AND ENTRY DATES PER LEGACY
AIRLINE
Airline

American
Airlines

Continental
Airlines

Delta
Airlines

Northwest
Airlines

United
Airlines

US
Airways

Announcement
Dates
107
103
93
86
87
90
Entry Dates
98
93
82
73
77
88
Note: A single LCC entry into one airport can affect numerous legacy airlines.

Total

566
511

V(ii). Methodology.
Two separate methodologies are used in this paper: stock price event studies and
regression analysis. The first approach derives from the seminal event study methods of
Brown and Warner [1980], which tests security price performance surrounding an event
date by calculating a cumulative abnormal return (CAR), defined as the summation of
three-day abnormal returns (AR) enveloping the event day: namely the day before the
event day, the event day, and the day following the event day. The calculation is based on
a market model in which the AR of any security is calculated as the actual return in
period t in excess of the market return in the same period. The market portfolio consists
of a linear combination of the securities in the S&P 500 Index obtained from Yahoo
Finance. Thus, the expected returns for any security should equal expected market
returns. An abnormal or excess return of a security i in period t (ARi,t) is the difference
between the return of security i in period t (Ri,t) and the expected market return expressed
as the daily S&P 500 return in period t (Rm,t):
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ARi,t

=

Ri,t – Rm,t

(1)

3

CARi

=

∑ ARi,t

(2)

t=1

Then we cumulate the abnormal returns (CAR) for three days, (t-1, t, and t+1),
relative to the event date, in recognition that investors could obtain information from
rumors about an entry as well as news leaks about the company on the day before the
actual announcement, or they could obtain their information from newspaper reports of
entries the day after the actual occurrence.
To examine a broader view of LCC entry into the industry, we look at quarterly
data for stock returns and examine the effects of competition and network expansion. We
hypothesize that LCC entry not only increases competition in the industry but also
expands the number of airline travelers. Because positive returns of the legacy airlines
result from investor expectations about competition and revenue expansion, we estimate a
system of simultaneous equations using two-stage least squares (2SLS) to test our
hypotheses.
First, we posit that when LCCs enter the market, the level of competition in the
industry will increase and the concentration level as measured by the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) will decrease. We compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) based on RPM, and use it to assess the level of market concentration. HHI is
calculated by giving more weight to firms with larger market shares.
n

HHI = ∑marketshare2 where n = number of firms in the industry.
i=1
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(3)

If the market share is represented as a percentage, the maximum value of HHI is
1.00, which occurs when one firm dominates the market (monopoly). Therefore, the
lower the HHI value, the more competition exists in the market, and the higher the HHI
the lower the competition. In our study, the HHI is an inverse proxy for competition, and
we expect the legacy airlines to experience higher profit and stock returns if they face
less competition.
Second, network externalities are created by an expansion of the base number of
travelers. We use revenue passenger miles 4 (RPMs) as a proxy for network expansion or
economies of scope. Unlike either the number of passengers or total airline revenues
alone, which are also available on RITA website, RPM provides a better measure because
it takes into account both revenues and number of passengers of the airlines.
An increased number of LCCs in the network will encourage travelers to fly more
at the affordable prices. LCCs bring more passengers from different routes and smaller
cities where no major carrier service connects to the hub-and-spoke system of the major
carriers. We expect that RPMs of legacy airlines will also be positively related to LCC
entry.
Because our hypothesis is multifaceted, we use the system of equations of two
stage least squares in which quarterly returns of the legacy airlines, changes in the level
of competition, and change in revenue passenger miles are the endogenous variables.

4

A Revenue Passenger Mile (RPM) is defined as one passenger transported one mile in revenue
service. Revenue passenger miles are computed by summation of the products of the revenue aircraft miles
on each inter-airport segment multiplied by the number of passengers carried on that segment.
http://www.transtats.bts.gov
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HHIRPM

=

β0 + β1LCC + β2PaxIndustry + η1

(4)

RPM

=

γ0 + γ1LCC + γ2GDPService + ν1

(5)

Ri,q

=

α0 + α1HHIRPM + α2RPM + α3(Rm-Rf) + α4SMB +

(6)

α5HML + ε1
Equation (4) measures the change in the level of competition using quarterly
RPMs of the entire industry, where LCC is the number of entries of low cost carriers
during the quarter. The announcements of LCC entries are not included because
announcements do not affect either the number of passengers or revenues of the legacy
airlines. We count the number of LCC entries reported in the Lexis-Nexis database and
news releases in the LCC websites. We also include the change in the total number of
passengers in the industry as a control variable. The coefficient β1 is expected to be
negative, which indicates the inverse relationship between an LCC entry and the level of
concentration, providing a reverse measure of competition.
Equation (5) measures the change in RPMs of each legacy airline. The number of
LCC entries is an exogenous variable; and the growth in GDP in service industries is also
included as a control variable. The coefficient is expected to be positive, which indicates
a positive relationship between LCC entry and network expansion.
In equation (6) we use the predicted value of the change in concentration and the
change in network expansion as independent variables to predict the endogenous variable
returns of the legacy airlines. We also include the Fama-French three factor benchmarks
as control variables. Fama and French [1993] present a model in which stock returns can
be explained by three factors: 1) the excess return on the market (Rm-Rf); 2) the size
premium, which is the average return on three small portfolios minus the average return
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on three big portfolios (SMB); and 3) the book to market ratio premium, which is the
average return on two value portfolios minus the average return on two growth portfolios
(HML).
We also test for the existence of multi-collinearity in the model to statistically
ensure the validity of our assumption that the variables used in the models are capturing
different aspects of the industrial economics. For example, in equation (4), the Herfindahl
index (HHIRPM) and RPMs are measured at airline level whereas the total of passengers
(PAXIndustry) is aggregated at the industry level. Thus the competitive effects should
show up in the RPMs but will have no effect on aggregated PAX. On the other hand,
spillover effects will affect aggregate PAX. We employ a classical econometric test for
diagnosing collinearity problems – the variance inflation factor (VIF) which is the
reciprocal of tolerance (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch [1980]). The high values of VIF
indicate a possibility of multi-collinearity. A value of 10 or higher for VIF (or 0.1 for
tolerance) is often used as the threshold to consider multi-collinearity to be a problem.
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VI. RESULTS
For an LCC serving a new airport, Table 4 shows the three-day cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) enveloping the announcement dates and shown separately for
entry dates. We find that all cumulative abnormal returns are positive on both
announcement and entry CARs and are significant and different from zero at a 0.05 level.
The announcement CAR of the overall sample ranging from 1970 to 2007 is 0.623% and
on the entry CAR is 0.825%. For the period from 1993 to 2007 during which we are able
to verify the existence of all six legacy airlines at all thirty one airports, we also observe
positive CARs of 0.34% and 0.89% on announcement and entry dates, respectively. The
results are surprising in the context of previous academic research since the market seems
to respond positively to LCC entrance. Thus, we conduct additional robustness analysis.
To compare the CARs between event and non-event months, we identify non-event
months as those months in which there is no LCC entry or announcement and compute
the CARs for each day in those months. We then compute rollover 3-day cumulative
abnormal returns for non-event months and average across the entire period. Results are
shown in Table 4, panel B. The non-event CAR of the entire period is 0.058% and of the
1993-2007 sub-period is -0.152%. We show in panel C that using either a pooled test or
Satterthwaite test 5, differences of CARs between announcement dates and non-event
dates, and entry dates and non-event dates are positive and statistically significant,
supporting our hypothesis about positive spillover effects.

5

The pooled test assumes that the two populations have equal variances and it uses degrees of
freedom n1+n2-2, where n1 and n2 are the sample sizes for the two populations. The Satterthwaite tests do
not assume that the populations have equal variances and it uses the Satterthwaite approximation for
degrees of freedom.
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TABLE 4
ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS SURROUNDING DATES
OF LOW COST CARRIER (LCC) ANNOUNCEMENT AND ACTUAL ENTRY
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of major airline stocks are computed for the threeday period enveloping the announcement dates and separately for actual entry dates of
LCCs. The calculations are based on a market model, in which abnormal return (AR) of
any securities is calculated as ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t , where ARi,t is the abnormal or excess
return of security i on day t. Ri,t is the return of a security i and day t. Rm,t is the daily
S&P500 return on day t obtained from Yahoo Finance. The ARs on the day preceding the
event, event day, and the day following the event are then cumulated to obtain CAR(1,0,+1) in Panel A. The analysis is conducted using the full sample period from 1970 to
2007 as well for a reduced sample periods from 1993 to 2007 when the presence of all six
legacy airlines on each of the 31 biggest airports can be verified using the DB1B dataset.
In Panel B, we present the average three-day CAR for non-event periods by excluding the
months in which an announcement or an entry occurs. The differences between event and
non-event returns are presented in Panel C. The pooled test assumes that the two
populations have equal variances and uses degrees of freedom n1+n2-2, where n1 and n2
are the sample sizes for the two populations. The Satterthwaite tests do not assume that
the populations have equal variances and uses the Satterthwaite approximation for
degrees of freedom.
Panel A. Market Model for the sample from 1970 to 2007 and subsample from 1993 to
2007
1970 - 2007
t-statistic and
CAR(-1,0,+1)
significance

1993 - 2007
t-statistic and
CAR(-1,0,+1)
significance

Announcement
Dates

0.623%

2.130**

0.340%

1.092

Entry Dates

0.825%

2.521**

0.892%

2.530**

Panel B. Average three day CARs in the Non-Event Months with no announcement or
entry.
1970 - 2007
t-statistic
CAR(-1,0,+1)
and
significance
Non-event
Returns

0.058%

1.736*
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1993 – 2007
CAR(-1,0,+1)

t-statistic and
significance

-0.152%

-1.650*

TABLE 4
ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS SURROUNDING DATES
OF LOW COST CARRIER (LCC) ANNOUNCEMENT AND ACTUAL ENTRY (CONTINUED)
Panel C. Difference between Event Returns in Panel A and Non-Event returns in Panel B.
1970 - 2007
1993 – 2007

Difference

Method

tValue Difference

in CAR
Announcement
minus

0.565%

non Event
Entry

minus

non Event

0.767%

Method

tValue

in CAR
Pooled

2.12**

Satterthwaite

1.92*

Pooled

2.73***

Satterthwaite

2.33**

0.492%

1.044%

Pooled

1.36

Satterthwaite

1.52

Pooled

2.74***

Satterthwaite 2.87***

*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively based on a paired ttest.

We perform additional sub-sample analysis to ensure that it is in line with
Whinston and Collin [1992] who find negative returns from the entry of People Express
during 1984–1985. Looking at the same period for the airlines that we analyze, we also
obtain negative average returns of -0.06% (t-stat -0.23) during 1984–1985 in response to
People Express entry. During the same period our sample has another entry by Southwest
Airlines with an announcement date on February 11, 1985 and entry date on March 17,
1985. The abnormal returns on these dates were also negative at -1.26% (t-stat -3.17) and
-1.28 (t-stat -3.03). However, these negative returns seem to pertain only to these very
early periods. Our overall sample, as well as the more recent periods within the sample, is
associated with positive announcement returns of 0.62% (t-stat 2.13) and positive entry
date CARs of 0.83% (t-stat 2.52) as shown in Table 4. Thus, the positive spillover effects
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seem to dominate the negative competitive effects in the more recent periods.Overall, our
analysis produces some unexpected results relative to conventional wisdom on the issue
of LCC entry. The entry or announcement of an LCC entry into a new airport was
considered to be an event that would negatively affect the stock returns of the established
airlines at that airport, because market entry of new competitors was assumed to
potentially reduce the market shares of the legacy airlines. However, only the
announcement and entry into hubs of the network carriers represent events that negatively
affect the stock as anticipated, although these results are not statistically significant. This
result at first appears counter-intuitive. As reported and depicted in Figure 5, most of the
major airlines have positive CAR during the three-day event window with an almost 1%
return, except United Airlines which shows negative returns. For the entry event, all
airlines also show positive response to the entry of LCCs with almost 1% CAR over the
three-day window.
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1.500%

1.000%
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0.500%

CAL
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CAR Day-1

CAR Day 0

Car Day +1

CAR

-0.500%

-1.000%

Panel A. Announcement Days.
1.600%

1.400%

1.200%
AMR
1.000%

CAL
DAL
NWA

0.800%

UAL
LCC

0.600%

CAR
0.400%

0.200%

0.000%
CAR t=-1

CAR t=0

CAR t=+1

Panel B. Entry Days.
Figure 5
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Legacy Airlines on Low Cost Airlines.
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of six major airline stocks around
announcement dates and entry dates of LCCs from the market model are illustrated. The
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is reported for the day before the event (t=-1) to the
day after the event (t=+1).
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Table 5 presents the 2SLS estimate of the system of equations. Panel A presents
the estimates for the impact of LCC entries on airline industry competition in equation
(4). The coefficient of LCC is negatively correlated with airline industry Herfindahl
index. The coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.05 significance level. Thus, LCC
entry has the hypothesized impact of increasing competition which points to reduced
pricing power and profitability of the legacy airlines. The coefficient on change in
number of passenger travelling by planes, which is our control variable, is positive and
significant at the 0.01 level. This implies that the greater the number of passengers
travelling, the higher the level of competition in the industry. This makes sense because
entry to new routes by both legacy airlines and low cost carriers becomes more attractive
when there is a potentially larger demand.
To assess the multicollinearity issues, the tolerance and VIF are reported in
columns 5 and 6. We find that all the VIFs in our models are less than 1.43 (ranging from
1.02 to 1.43), which is well within the values of 10 or higher for VIF, an often used as the
threshold to consider multi-collinearity to be a problem (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch
[1980]). Therefore, we can be confident that the variables in our models do not suffer
from multi-collinearity problems.
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TABLE 5
TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS
The first stage regressions are estimates of the effects of LCC entry on competition and
network expansion. The predicted value of changes in competition and network
expansion are then used in the second stage to estimate the effect on the legacy airline
stock returns.
HHIRPM

=

β0 + β1LCC + β2PaxIndustry + η1

(4)

RPM

=

γ0 + γ1LCC + γ2GDPService + ν1

(5)

Ri,q

=

α0 + α1HHIRPM + α2RPM + α3(Rm-Rf) + α4SMB +

(6)

α5HML + ε1
Ri,q is the return of legacy airline i in quarter q. Other than for stock returns, the
subscripts i and q are not shown for simplicity. ΔHHIRPM is the percentage change in
level of concentration as measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, using revenue
passenger miles (RPM) from every passenger airline in the industry in quarter q. ΔRPM
is the percentage change in RPM of the legacy airline i in quarter q. LCC is number of
low cost airline entries in quarter q. Rm-Rf, SMB, and HML are the 3 benchmarks from
the Fama and French [1993] three factor model. ΔPaxIndustry is the entire industry
percentage change in number of passengers travelling by plane. ΔGDPService is the
percentage change of quarterly GDP in the service industry. The error terms are ε1,η1,
and ν1.
Panel A: LCC Entry Impact on Airline Industry Competition
Eq.(4) : ΔHHIRPM = β0 + β1 LCC + β2 ΔPaxIndustry + η2
Tolerance

Variance

Variables

Estimates

Standard Errors

tValue

Intercept

0.04444

0.15974

0.28

-

-

LCC

-0.17537

0.08803

-1.99**

0.95084

1.05170

ΔPaxIndustry

5.35561

1.55276

3.45***

0.95084

1.05170
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Inflation

TABLE 5
TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS. (CONTINUED)
Panel B: Network Expansion Benefits of LCC Entry
Eq.(5) : ΔRPM = γ0 + γ1 LCC + γ2 ΔGDPService + ν1
Tolerance
Variables
Intercept

Estimates
-5.22843

Standard Errors
2.52759

tValue
-2.07*

-

Variance
Inflation
-

LCC

0.76278

0.37589

2.01*

0.97594

1.02466

ΔGDPService

3.69670

1.55527

2.38*

0.97594

1.02466

Panel C: Stock returns response to competition and network expansion generated by LCC
entry.
Eq.(6) : Ri,q = α0 + α1ΔHHIRPM + α2ΔRPM + α3(Rm-Rf) + α4SMB + α5HML+ ε1
Tolerance
Variance
Variables
Estimates
Standard Errors tValue
Inflation
***
Intercept
-0.09771
0.02025
-4.82
ΔHHIRPM

-0.07581

0.0355

-2.13**

0.97372

1.02699

ΔRPM

0.02849

0.01019

2.80***

0.96752

1.03358

Rm-Rf

0.02368

0.00215

11.04**

0.69912

1.43038

SMB

-0.000789

0.003283

-0.28

0.78724

1.27025

HML

0.01292

0.00205

6.31***

0.86541

1.15552

*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.

Panel B presents the estimates from the equation (5) for spillover benefits of
network expansion. The coefficient of LCC entry is positive and significant at the 0.05
level. This implies that an increase in number of low cost carriers increases overall
business activity in the airline sector, with some portion of this increase accruing to the
legacy airlines. Our control variable in this regression is economic growth, particularly in
the service industry (measured by GDP Services), because demand for airline travel is
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expected to increase in a growing economy. The coefficient is positive and significant as
hypothesized.
Panel C presents the second stage regression results for airline stock returns using
the predicted values for competition and network expansion from the first stage
regressions, which become our key explanatory variables. The coefficient on the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is an inverse measure of competition, is
negative 7% while that of network expansion is positive 3%. These results are in line
with the intuition that the entry of an LCC generates a trade-off between increased
competitions versus increased opportunities resulting from network expansion. The
coefficient for the control variable, quarterly market return shows a significant and
positive relation with airline returns. The results of regression support our hypotheses that
after controlling for overall market return, the stock return of legacy airlines are impacted
negatively from higher competition and positively from network expansion.

VII. CONCLUSIONS
This study examined the impact on the stock prices of major legacy airlines of
LCC entry announcements and actual entries into the airport markets of established
carriers. As a surprising result, significant positive abnormal returns are observed. These
effects of LCC entry may be explained either by the more critical importance of other
variables or, more likely, by the economic factor of positive network externalities, in the
form of spillovers or economies of scope, that increase the revenues of legacy airlines.
We examine the broader view from quarterly data with two stage least squares regression
models. We posit that there are two possible explanations for the effects of LCC entry
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and that these have contrasting impacts: the first is competition and the second is network
expansion.
First, the legacy airlines face a higher level of competition when LCCs enter their
markets with new routes. Since the deregulation of the airline industry three decades ago,
numerous upstart airlines have tried to copy the business model of Southwest Airlines.
Most investors are likely to consider an LCC entry as a catalyst of increased competition
in the industry. In contrast, the network expansion effect from LCC entry into the market
of an established airline may enhance the position of the legacy carrier by producing
positive economic externalities or spillovers instead of a loss of market share. These
externalities are achieved through economies of scope by the aggregation and
enhancement of transportation opportunities within the airport area. If a new LCC enters
an airport, it may increase the air traffic and connections between open routes of major
airlines and increase the number of passengers into the airport from sources where no
connection previously existed. Or the LCC entry may connect more people to that airport,
even if an established carrier previously served the same city-pair. Because an LCC
reduces the airfares on that route, more people can afford to fly the route, and the demand
for tickets on the connecting network airline is increased. Usually, the established carrier
has been in the airport for a longer time and serves more and further destinations. More
passengers flying into the airport on the new LCC route result in increased demand for
connecting flights of the established carriers. Thus, an LCC entry may increase revenues
and enplanements of the network carriers by providing more connecting customers and
fulfil an objective of the hub-and-spoke system. As a result, stock prices of the legacy
airlines would increase rather than decrease. Thus, investors could consider the LCC
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entry to be a marginal event in terms of anticipated effects on the revenue of legacy
airlines and more significant in terms of providing a competitive catalyst. Alternately, the
entry of an LCC could be an event with low impact that is blurred by more significant
events. The airline industry is dependent on many factors, such as oil prices and the
macroeconomic situation, and these often produce an unstable oligopoly environment. In
this scenario, mergers and acquisitions, as well as bankruptcies, may be more likely to
impact stock prices than the entry of competing LCCs (Rubin and Joy [2005]).
In the short run the unexpected results we find for three day cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR) could be due to several limitations of this study that may be explored in
future research. First, LCC entries into hubs are more meaningful to the legacy airlines
than LCC entries into other major airports, because the largest components of the
network carrier operations are located in their hub airports. Based on the limited number
of hub airports, the sample of entries into hubs does not include enough events to produce
meaningful results. In future research, sample size might be expanded by increasing the
number of LCCs. Alternately, the number of airports could be increased instead of using
only entries into the largest and hub airports. Additionally, the first LCC entry into a
particular airport could be more significant than subsequent entries because, in that initial
case, investors do not know how much an LCC entry affects the revenues of legacy
airlines. This alternative approach would probably place more focus on Southwest
Airlines, which was the first LCC into most airports. Further, this alternative would
severely limit the number of entry and announcement dates for analysis and, based on our
results for hubs only, would probably yield insignificant results. Future research could
use a different definition of a market of the legacy airlines. While this study defines a
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market as an airport location, an alternative approach could define a market as a route
between two cities. If an LCC added a new city-pair, possibly one of the most profitable
routes for an established carrier, the network airline might incur larger impacts if it is
forced to lower its airfares, thereby reducing profit.
Despite these considerations, the airline industry is a critical transportation
medium in an increasingly global world, particularly for business, and provides a
dynamic field of study with many approaches for research. Due to its oligopoly structure,
unique economic and financial analyses can be studied. Further, besides insurance
companies, airlines were undoubtedly the companies that were most affected by the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath, airlines went bankrupt or were
forced into mergers; the most recent examples are the bankruptcy of ATA Airlines, the
withdrawal of Frontier from several airports and the 2008 merger of Delta and Northwest
Airlines.
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CONCLUSIONS
My dissertation consists of two essays concerning corporate announcements and
their effects on market responses. The first essay investigates the information contents
from corporate earnings announcements in the after-hours sessions. The second essay
examines the effects of low cost airline announcements and entries on the legacy airlines
on the basis of competition and network expansion.
In essay 1, we find that investors react immediately upon corporate earnings
announcements within the after-hours sessions. Even though after-hours trading volume
is relatively low compared to the regular trading hours, we find that trading activities are
greatly heightened up on the earnings announcement days when compared to the nonannouncement days. We provide the empirical evidence suggesting that after-hours
trading play a significant role in allowing investors to react quickly to breaking news
stories or the most up-to-date information. We find that the investors act quickly
following the earnings announcements when we observe immediate price reaction during
the after-hours periods. The trades during the BMO and AMC periods contribute 36%
and 60% of price changes, respectively. Price discovery are also much higher for the
AHT following the event despite relatively low volume. We also find that prices in AHT
show a large degree of information efficiency, which demonstrates that prices are not
likely to be completely driven by noise trading.
Essay 2 presents the impacts from the entry announcement by low cost carriers
(LCCs) on the legacy airlines. As opposed to previous findings, we find significant
positive abnormal returns of legacy airline stocks on the announcements and entry dates
of LCCs. One explanation is that when LCCs enter their market with new routes, the
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legacy airlines face a higher level of competition while they also benefit from network
expansion of LCCs’ new routes. LCCs may help increase the air traffic and connections
between open routes of major airlines and increase the number of passengers for the
airport from sources that were not previously served. As a result, stock prices of the
legacy airlines would increase rather than decrease. We then examine the broader view
from quarterly data with two stage square regression models. The regression results show
that the entry of LCCs creates the higher level of competition in the industry and
increases the overall business activity of the legacy airlines. The regression results on the
stock return of legacy airlines after controlling for overall market condition also supports
our hypotheses. The stock returns of legacy airlines are affected negatively by higher
competition and positively by network expansion.
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